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1401 
SINGLE-FAMILY ZONING, INTIMATE ASSOCIATION, AND THE 
RIGHT TO CHOOSE HOUSEHOLD COMPANIONS 
Rigel C. Oliveri* 
“[P]eople consider their right to pass judgment upon their future 
neighbors as sacred.”1 
Abstract 
Many local governments use single-family zoning ordinances to 
restrict occupancy in residential areas to households whose members are 
all related to one another by blood, marriage, or adoption. The Supreme 
Court upheld such ordinances in the 1974 case of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
and they have been used to prevent all sorts of groups from living 
together—from unmarried couples who are raising children to college 
students. This Article contends that Belle Terre is wholly incompatible 
with the Court’s modern jurisprudence on privacy and the right of 
intimate association. The case appears to have survived this long because 
of a reflexive deference paid to the “police power,” which gives local 
governments wide latitude to pass laws to promote the general welfare of 
the community. This Article disputes that the police power can stretch so 
far, and asserts that Constitutional protection should attach to the choice 
of household companions. If such protection is accorded, the reasons 
traditionally given for such ordinances—reduction of overcrowding, 
protection of children—fail to stand up to heightened scrutiny. This 
Article also takes issue with so-called “functional family” reforms, which 
allow groups who resemble or operate like families to live in single-
family zoned areas. While these reforms do expand the class of people 
who can choose their household companions, they leave untouched the 
assumption that governments can regulate this decision absent a 
compelling reason. Moreover, they allow government actors to decide, 
based on largely subjective criteria and after an often-invasive inquiry, 
whether groups of people are sufficiently “family-like” to live together. 
If the right of intimate association within the home is to have any force, 
it must be available to everyone, regardless of their identities, 
motivations, or characteristics. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. I am grateful for comments and 
suggestions from Tim Iglesias, Robert Schwemm, and, as always, Michael Byrne. Early versions 
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Legal Scholarship Conference, and at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual 
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 1. RICHARD F. BABCOCK & FRED P. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE 
REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970S, at 90 (1973). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: A man and a woman have been 
together for thirteen years. They buy a house big enough for the two of 
them, their two children, and the woman’s daughter from a previous 
marriage. But before they move in, zoning authorities inform them that 
their occupancy of the home is illegal and they will be subject to 
prohibitive fines should they live there—or anywhere in the 
neighborhood. The reason? Because the man and woman are not married 
to one another. You might guess that these events occurred long ago, 
when laws and social mores were more conservative with respect to 
marriage. In fact, this happened in 2006, in Black Jack, Missouri, when 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/8
2015] THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE HOUSEHOLD COMPANIONS 1403 
 
Fondray Loving, his fiancée Olivia Shelltrack, and their three children 
were told they could not occupy the five-bedroom house they had 
purchased.2 And this was not an isolated case.3  
The early part of the twenty-first century has seen profound changes 
in how Americans live: increased numbers of people are living together 
outside of wedlock; nonmarital births and child-rearing are on the rise; 
and the Supreme Court has recently recognized a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage. Direct governmental regulation of private intimate 
conduct, such as fornication and adultery, has diminished almost entirely.  
Yet there is still one mechanism by which local governments can—
and do—interfere with people’s ability to live together outside of a 
traditional marital relationship: single-family zoning ordinances. Such 
ordinances may place whole neighborhoods, or even entire towns, off-
limits to people who wish to live together but who do not fit into a 
traditional definition of “family,” which requires that members be related 
to one another through blood, marriage, or adoption.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Eun Kyung Kim, Law Means Unwed Couple, 3 Kids May Be . . . Booted from Black 
Jack, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH A1 (Feb. 22, 2006).  
 3. The litigation of the Shelltrack case uncovered evidence that at least four other couples 
had been denied occupancy permits to live in Black Jack because they were unmarried and living 
with children, including a couple who were the parents of triplets. P.J. Huffstutter, Housing Code 
Defines What Makes a Family, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/
2006/may/21/nation/na-family21. Accounts of examples from other cities and states include: 
Michael Tackett, An Imperfect Family Circle Squares Off With Zoning Law, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 9, 
1986), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-11-09/news/8603240201_1_ordinance-single-
family-zoning-appeals-court (noting that a Ladue, Missouri zoning law prevents unmarried 
couples from living together); Nancy Larson, Gay Families, Keep Out!, ADVOCATE, July 18, 2006, 
at 34, 34 (discussing a lesbian couple and their daughter who were warned by real estate agents 
that a Ladue, Missouri zoning ordinance would prevent them from living together) Denver Zoning 
Fight Turns on Defining a Family, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/26/us/denver-zoning-fight-turns-on-defining-a-family.html 
(noting that a Denver, Colorado zoning law prevents unmarried couples from living together); 
Ann Scales Cobbs, Couple Rebuffed by Jennings, Ferguson on Occupancy Permits, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH 8D (May 26, 1991) (noting that a Ferguson, Missouri zoning law prevents an 
unmarried couple from living with two of the woman’s relatives); Jack W. Greer, ‘Family’ 
Crackdown Planned, Unmarried Couples Face Citation from Attorney, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
A1 (July 21, 1994) (noting that a village attorney charged several unmarried couples with 
violating a Wilbur Park, Missouri zoning law); Ray Quintanilla, Town Finds New Family Ties 
Knotty, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 22, 1995), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-09-
22/news/9509220323_1_ordinance-unrelated-people-living (noting that a Crystal Lake, Illinois 
zoning law prevented an unmarried couple from living with their four children from previous 
relationships); Stephanie McCrummen, Manassas Changes Definition of Family, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/27/AR200512 
2701216.html (noting that a Manassas, Virginia zoning law prevented a couple from living with 
the woman’s nephew). See generally Geneva Collins, Zoning and Public Housing Rules Dictate 
Who May Live with Whom, L.A. TIMES (Mar.19, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-
19/news/mn-274_1_public-housing (discussing cities around the United States with restrictive 
zoning laws). 
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It is not just unmarried couples raising children together who are 
affected by single-family ordinances. These zoning rules may prevent 
anyone who, for whatever reason, wishes to live in an arrangement 
outside that of a biologically or legally related family—five elderly 
widows, six college students, a minister and his family who take in a 
needy family, four childhood best friends, or six members of a 
professional sports team—from residing in single-family zoned 
neighborhoods. Indeed, many people (including this author) have had the 
experience of being a college student unable to legally rent a house with 
schoolmates because of zoning restrictions on the number of unrelated 
people who can live together.4 
On one hand, the law in this regard appears to be settled, at least at the 
federal level. In the 1974 case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,5 the 
Supreme Court held that unrelated people have no right to live together 
and upheld a restrictive single-family ordinance under minimal scrutiny.6 
During this same time period, however, the Court was recognizing an 
increasingly robust right of association in the context of intimate 
relationships and strong “spatial privacy” rights within the home.7 A 
number of recent non-zoning cases make clear that intimate activities and 
relationships deserve special protection, particularly when they are 
situated within the home.8 All of this is difficult, if not impossible, to 
reconcile with Belle Terre,9 which appears to have survived this long 
because of a reflexive deference paid to the “police power” that gives 
local governments wide latitude to enact zoning ordinances in order to 
promote the general welfare of the community.10  
Mitigation of the harsh results of Belle Terre has come from two 
sources. First, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Moore v. City of East 
                                                                                                                     
 4. A particularly entertaining example of this occurred in Washington D.C. in 2006 when 
Brian O’Neill Jr. sought to live with a group of his classmates in a Georgetown house owned by 
his father. Michelle Boorstein, For Georgetown “Apostles,” A Rowhouse Rebellion, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 11, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/10/AR200611 
1001978.html. Zoning laws restricted the number of unrelated people who could live together 
unless they were members of a “religious community,” so Brian’s friends filed paperwork to 
incorporate themselves as a non-profit religious organization called “The Apostles of O’Neill.” 
Id. Their attempt to evade the zoning laws ultimately failed. See Michelle Boorstein, “Apostles” 
Ordered to Abide by Zoning Laws, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/22/AR2006112201924.html.  
 5. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 6. See id. at 7–9. 
 7. See infra Sections II.B–C (examining both the rationale and case law). 
 8. See infra Section II.C (same).  
 9. This is especially so in light of the fact that one of the most forceful early opinions 
endorsing associational rights within the home was written by Justice William Douglas, see U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538–45 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring), who went on 
to write the majority opinion in Belle Terre. 416 U.S. at 2. 
 10. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.  
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Cleveland11 invalidated a single-family zoning law that would have 
prevented extended family members from living together.12 Second, 
more recently some municipalities have liberalized their ordinances to 
permit so-called “functional families” (unrelated people who live 
together as a family) or unmarried couples with children to live in single-
family zoned areas. A number of commentators similarly argue that the 
right of intimate association must also protect nontraditional yet clearly 
intimate family-like relationships, and a handful of state courts have 
relied on their state constitutions to invalidate single-family ordinances 
as they applied to functional families.  
This Article makes two central arguments: First is the fairly obvious 
conclusion that Belle Terre is wholly incompatible with the Court’s 
modern associational rights jurisprudence. The right to choose household 
companions is clearly the sort of intimate association that the law should 
protect from unwarranted governmental intrusion. As such, heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate for governmental actions that interfere with it. 
When the reasons historically offered for single-family zoning laws 
receive heightened scrutiny, they fail.  
Second, this Article contends that Moore’s protection of extended 
families and the recent “functional family” reforms, while superficially a 
step in the right direction, do not go far enough and ultimately miss the 
point. Simply broadening the definition of family fails to question how 
local governments can use zoning to prevent people from living together 
based on their relationship to one another in the first place. These reforms 
require courts and zoning boards to make value judgments about whether 
particular households are acceptable family substitutes and to condition 
their ability to live together on how they measure up. While this approach 
allows more groups to live together than a restrictive regime, it still does 
violence to the concept of associational rights. If it means anything, the 
right to choose household companions must protect all people who wish 
to live together—or coreside13—regardless of their identities, 
relationship, or reason for doing so. 
Part I of this Article discusses the history of single-family zoning and 
its treatment by federal and state courts. Part II traces the origins and 
development of the Supreme Court’s associational rights jurisprudence, 
noting the Court’s inconsistency with respect to the sources and 
                                                                                                                     
 11. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 12. Id. at 495–96, 499–500, 505–06.  
 13. This Article uses the term coreside, meaning the act of sharing a dwelling unit with 
another person, rather than the more familiar but narrower term, “cohabitate.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines cohabitation as “[t]he fact or state of living together, [especially] as partners 
in life, [usually] with the suggestion of sexual relations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (9th ed. 
2009). “Coresidence,” in contrast, does not carry any sexual connotation, time commitment, or 
other relationship requirements. For reasons discussed later in this Article, this is a significant 
distinction. See infra Part III. 
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justifications of the right to associate. Part III connects the right to 
associate with the right to choose one’s living companions, arguing that 
the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area leads 
inexorably toward recognizing such a right. This Part also discusses 
functional family reforms, concluding that while they are a good start, 
they do not go far enough to protect people’s liberty interests in choosing 
living companions. It questions whether the police power can really 
stretch far enough to authorize the regulation of household composition, 
particularly when advocates of such ordinances rely on unsupported 
stereotypes about unrelated households and when the ordinances fail on 
their own terms to meet the needs they purport to address. This Part then 
analyzes whether single-family zoning is justifiable under either of the 
prevailing models of local government legitimacy. 
Part IV addresses how both single-family zoning laws and the Belle 
Terre decision are heavily grounded in historical context, with 
assumptions about residential living patterns and perceived threats 
thereto that no longer apply today. In light of all of this, it is appropriate 
for the Supreme Court to revisit single-family zoning laws and to 
overturn Belle Terre, a move that will not deprive local governments of 
the ability to accomplish legitimate zoning objectives. Finally, this Part 
also addresses likely criticisms of this analysis from supporters of single-
family ordinances as well as fair housing advocates, who often find 
themselves at odds with municipal zoning authorities.  
I.  SINGLE-FAMILY ZONING 
This Part discusses the history of single-family zoning, including 
explanations of some key terms. It continues with an examination of the 
impact federal and state courts and the Fair Housing Act have had on 
these zoning laws. 
A.  History 
Zoning laws emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century.14 
Initially concerned with alleviating overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary 
conditions in urban centers, most early zoning codes contained 
regulations on the height, use, and density of structures on land.15 Over 
time, zoning ordinances evolved from simple prohibitions of offensive 
conditions to more comprehensive plans for land use throughout an entire 
community.16  
                                                                                                                     
 14. 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 1:2 (4th ed. 2014).  
 15. See id.  
 16. Id.  
6
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The U.S. Supreme Court validated comprehensive zoning as a 
legitimate use of the police power in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co.17 At issue in that case was the validity of a plan that divided up the 
entire area of the Village into six classes of use districts including single-
family, dual-family, and multifamily dwellings, as well as commercial, 
light industrial, and heavy industrial.18 In upholding the plan, the Court 
emphasized that comprehensive zoning laws of this sort could 
appropriately serve a variety of interests such as promoting health and 
safety, preventing disorder, and more efficiently delivering community 
services.19 Recognizing that every community has different 
circumstances and conditions, the Court was reluctant to prescribe precise 
limits to the exercise of this power.20 Rather, it said that “[i]f the validity 
of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, 
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”21 The Court went 
on to make clear that an ordinance should not be found unconstitutional 
unless it was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”22 Two 
years later in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,23 the Court recognized such 
an unreasonable application when it struck down an arbitrary-seeming 
zoning ordinance that a Special Master had determined did “not promote 
the health, safety, convenience, and general welfare of the inhabitants of 
that part of the defendant city.”24 
In the wake of Euclid, virtually every municipality in the country 
developed zoning ordinances and implemented some form of land use 
planning that designated residential areas.25 Ordinances typically 
specified that some residential areas were to be zoned for “single 
families” (as opposed to multi-family apartment buildings) and defined 
“family” in terms of a “single, non-profit housekeeping unit.”26 They did 
not attempt to define family further in terms of the identities of household 
members.27  
                                                                                                                     
 17. 272 U.S. 365, 379–80, 386, 397 (1926). 
 18. Id. at 379–81. 
 19. See id. at 391. 
 20. Id. at 387–88.  
 21. Id. at 388.  
 22. Id. at 395. 
 23. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 24. Id. at 187–89 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. See 1 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 1:2. 
 26. See Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America’s Families: Control, Exclusion, and 
Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1258–59, 1259 n.148 (2005). “Housekeeping unit” was not often 
further defined, but courts usually construed it to mean a living situation in which residents have 
access to the whole dwelling and share common housekeeping facilities. 2 RATHKOPF & 
RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:14.  
 27. Alexander, supra note 26, at 1258.  
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Toward the middle of the twentieth century, the focus of single-family 
zoning laws shifted from the use of the land to the identity of the users.28 
In particular, as the baby boom went into full swing and the notion of the 
“nuclear family” began to take hold in the popular imagination, the 
suburbs were developed as the ideal place for young (white) families to 
live.29 Zoning authorities moved away from the more neutral term “single 
housekeeping unit” and started defining “family” in terms of the 
relationships between the household members, requiring that they be 
related by “blood, marriage, or adoption.”30 Some went further to 
describe the degree of relatedness or consanguinity that would be 
required: for example, some allowed nuclear family members and a 
grandparent to constitute a family, but not adult siblings or cousins.31 
Most ordinances permitted families to include one or two unrelated 
individuals, which allowed for live-in servants, borders, or guests.32 
Many ordinances also contained an exception allowing a small number 
of unrelated people to live together as a family.33  
Not every jurisdiction moved to this type of single-family ordinance, 
with a relationship-based definition of family and limits placed on 
unrelated household members. Some areas retained the original “single 
housekeeping unit” definition.34 Because both types of ordinances tend 
to be referred to as “single-family ordinances,” this Article will refer to 
the former type as “restrictive single-family ordinances” and the latter 
type as “single-household ordinances.” 
B.  Definitions and Examples 
Today, restrictive single-family zoning ordinances exist in various 
forms throughout the United States.35 While they may differ in their 
particulars, all have the same basic framework. They define “family” to 
mean “related by blood, marriage, or adoption” (sometimes with the 
specific relationships defined further) and permit families of any size to 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 1259–60.  
 29. See id. (noting that the coining of the term “nuclear family” coincided with the shift 
away from a functional definition of a household unit to one which defined “family”); 3 
RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 36.9 & n.1 (discussing the exclusionary effects of local 
zoning). 
 30. Alexander, supra note 26, at 1259–60.  
 31. Id. at 1262.  
 32. Id. at 1260.  
 33. 2 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:8. 
 34. See id. § 23:17.  
 35. See Alexander, supra note 26, at 1257, 1264–65. An exact count is likely impossible. 
There were over 36,000 municipalities, cities, towns, townships, and other political subdivisions 
counted in the most recent census, and even the best municipal code databases are not complete. 
Population of Interest-Municipalities and Townships, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.g 
ov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html (last visited July 1, 2015).  
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live together.36 Some ordinances permit a limited number of unrelated 
people (usually one or two) to live in a household of related individuals.37 
Finally, most ordinances also allow a family to consist of a small number 
of unrelated people (usually two or three, and rarely more than four) who 
live together.38 The justifications typically given for such ordinances 
include: the need to preserve the “family character” of the neighborhood, 
often to ensure that it remains a suitable place for children; the need to 
prevent overcrowding, noise, and traffic; and the need to protect property 
values.39 
Columbia, Missouri (home of the author), offers a representative 
example, and provides the following information to citizens on its 
website:40 
What is a Family? 
What the code says: According to Chapter 29—Zoning 
of City Ordinance, the definition of Family is: 
(1) An individual or married couple and the children 
thereof and no more than two (2) other persons related 
directly to the individual or married couple by blood or 
marriage, occupying a single housekeeping unit on a 
nonprofit basis. A family may include not more than one 
additional person, not related to the family by blood or 
marriage; or 
(2) a.1. In zoning districts R-1 . . . a group of not more 
than three (3) persons not related by blood or marriage, 
living together by joint agreement and occupying a single 
housekeeping unit on a nonprofit cost-sharing basis. 
. . . .  
b. In all other applicable zoning districts, a group of not 
more than four (4) persons not related by blood or marriage, 
living together by joint agreement and occupying a single 
housekeeping unit on a nonprofit cost-sharing basis.41 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See 2 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:8.  
 37. Alexander, supra note 26, at 1260. 
 38. 2 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:18. For ease of reference, this Article 
will refer to households that violate restrictive single-family ordinances as “unrelated 
households.” This is not a perfectly accurate term, however, because such households—like the 
Shelltrack–Loving household—may well contain members who are related to one another. See 
supra note 2–3 and accompanying text.  
 39.  E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391–92, 394 (1926); 1 
RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 1:2. 
 40. The page can be found at https://www.gocolumbiamo.com/community_development/
neighborhoods/renting/documents/WhatisaFamily.pdf. 
 41. See also COLUMBIA, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-2 (1964), available at 
9
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The reasons Columbia gives to support these limitations are the need to 
reduce traffic, trash, and noise.42 Columbia also provides the following 
examples and explanations of acceptable and unacceptable household 
compositions:43 
 
Acceptable examples:  
Mr. & Mrs. Jones and their children 
Bobby and Katie +  
Mrs. Jones’ parents + Jennifer 
Doe, a 
friend  
Mrs. Thomas and her three children + Her aunt and uncle + Her cousin 
(although 
related, 
could be 
counted as 
one other 
unrelated 
person)  
Mr. and Mrs. Rogers and their son + Mr. Rogers’ brother and his 
son 
 
Examples in violation of this code: 
Mr. & Mrs. Jones and their children 
Bobby and Katie +  
Mrs. Jones’ sister and 
brother-in-law and their 
three children 
 
Why is this a violation? The addition of Mrs. Jones sister and her family exceeds the 
two related people and one additional unrelated person. 
Bob Campbell +  Bob’s two brothers + Two 
unrelated 
roommates  
Why is this a violation? The total number of occupants in this example is five. One 
unrelated roommate would need to move out to be in compliance in any zoning 
district.  
John Doe + Three unrelated roommates  
Why is this a violation? It exceeds the three unrelated people allowed in R-1 zoning; 
it would be allowable in all other zoning districts.
Jane Roberts +  Four unrelated roommates 
Why is this a violation? Four or more unrelated people are not allowed in any zoning 
district. If one roommate left it would be acceptable in all zoning districts except  
R-1; Jane and two roommates are acceptable in R-1. 
 
Although they are phrased in terms of occupancy and number of 
people, it is important to distinguish restrictive single-family ordinances 
such as this one from numerical occupancy limits, which are part of 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.municode.com/library/#!/mo/columbia/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COORCOM
I_CH29ZO.  
 42. What is a Family?, CITY COLUMBIA, MO., https://www.gocolumbiamo.com/
community_development/neighborhoods/renting/documents/WhatisaFamily.pdf (last visited 
July 1, 2015).  
 43. Id.  
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virtually every municipality’s property maintenance code.44 Numerical 
occupancy limits refer to the number of people who can occupy a 
dwelling.45 These limits are based on the square footage, number, and 
configuration of the various rooms in the dwelling unit.46 Their purpose 
is to ensure safety, privacy, and sanitation, and to prevent 
overcrowding.47  
Put simply, numerical occupancy limits focus on the absolute number 
of people who can reside in a dwelling, regardless of their relationship to 
one another. Restrictive single-family ordinances focus on the 
relationship of the occupants, limiting only the number of unrelated 
household members. Thus, a restrictive single-family ordinance may 
allow larger groups while barring smaller ones.48 Nevertheless, the two 
issues—limiting numerical occupancy and regulating household 
composition—are frequently conflated by proponents of single-family 
zoning ordinances.49 
C.  Judicial Treatment of Single-Family Zoning 
This Section discusses the approaches taken by the courts in analyzing 
these ordinances. It addresses the potential differences between outcomes 
in federal and state courts when state courts look to their respective state 
constitutions. 
1.  Federal Courts 
After Euclid and Nectow, the Supreme Court did not significantly 
address zoning again until 1974, with the case of Village of Belle Terre 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Many jurisdictions, including the City of Columbia, use the numerical occupancy limits 
set forth in the International Property Maintenance Code. See 2012 INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY 
MAINTENANCE CODE § 404 (2011), available at ftp://law.resource.org/pub/us/code/ibr/
icc.ipmc.2012.html; International Codes-Adoption by State, ICC (Feb. 2015), 
http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/Documents/stateadoptions.pdf.; The Facts About the Property 
Maintenance Code, CITY OF COLUMBIA, MO., https://www.gocolumbiamo.com/
community_development/neighborhoods/documents/PropertyMaintanence.pdf (last visited July 
1, 2015). 
 45. E.g., Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 316 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994) (discussing a numerical occupancy limit of two persons per apartment unit).  
 46. E.g., 2012 INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE § 404.2–.4, 404.6.  
 47. See, e.g., 2012 INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE § 404.1 (discussing 
privacy); id. § 404.45 (noting requirements for smoke detectors and emergency escape 
requirements); id. § 404.5 (discussing prohibition on overcrowding); id. § 404.7 (discussing 
requirements for sanitary food preparation spaces).  
 48. The examples provided by the City of Columbia are instructive: the first household, 
which contains seven individuals, is permitted, while the sixth household, which consists of four 
unrelated roommates, would violate the ordinance. See supra chart accompanying note 43. 
 49. None of the cases discussed in this Article involve households that violated numerical 
occupancy limits. 
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v. Boraas.50 At issue was the validity of a restrictive single-family zoning 
ordinance that defined “family” to mean “[o]ne or more persons related 
by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single 
housekeeping unit,” with a narrow exception for no more than two 
unrelated people living and cooking together as a single housekeeping 
unit.51 The ordinance applied to the Village’s entire residential area, 
which meant that three or more unrelated people were prohibited from 
living together anywhere in Belle Terre.52  
A group of six unrelated college students who wished to rent a house 
together and the landlord who wished to rent it to them challenged the 
ordinance on a variety of grounds.53 Writing for the majority, Justice 
William Douglas summarily concluded that the ordinance “involve[d] no 
‘fundamental’ right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as . . . the right 
of association . . . or any rights of privacy.”54 Because he considered no 
fundamental rights to be at stake, Justice Douglas used only a rational 
basis standard of review.55 In a now-famous passage, he described the 
government’s purpose in dramatic terms: 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor 
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use 
project addressed to family needs. . . . The police power is 
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, 
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean 
air make the area a sanctuary for people.56  
Justice Douglas concluded that the Village’s ordinance was rationally 
related to the goal of preserving a low-density, family-oriented, small-
town lifestyle because limiting the housing to families would tend to 
reduce crowding, traffic, and noise.57  
In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall took issue with the majority’s 
refusal to recognize that fundamental rights were implicated, arguing that 
the ordinance burdened the students’ First Amendment freedom of 
association and their constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.58 He 
                                                                                                                     
 50. 416 U.S. 1, 3 (1974). 
 51. Id. at 2 (alteration in original). The statute placed no limit on the number of people 
related by blood, marriage, or adoption who could live together. See id. 
 52. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in dissent, “[t]he village ha[d], in effect, acted to 
fence out those individuals whose choice of lifestyle differs from that of its current residents.” Id. 
at 16–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 2–3, 7 (majority opinion). 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Id. at 7–8.  
 56. Id. at 9.  
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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described the two rights (privacy and association) as operating together 
to create a space in which people should be free to make decisions about 
how they live and to conduct their personal relationships without 
governmental interference.59 As a result, he believed that the ordinance 
could only withstand constitutional scrutiny “upon a clear showing that 
the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial 
government interest.”60 
Applying the heightened level of scrutiny, Justice Marshall argued 
that the Village’s stated interests, while legitimate and substantial, were 
not served by an ordinance that limited the number of unrelated people 
who could live together but permitted an unlimited number of related 
people to live together.61 He noted that numerical occupancy restrictions 
would be a far more effective way to deal with population density and its 
related problems.62  
Just three years later, the Court again took up the issue of restrictive 
single-family zoning in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.63 The ordinance 
at issue in that case sought to limit the types of extended family members 
who could live together.64 It contained a complicated definition of 
“family” that prevented a woman from living with her son and two 
grandchildren because the boys were first cousins and not brothers.65 In 
contrast with Belle Terre, a plurality of the Moore Court assumed that the 
group constituted a family regardless of the ordinance’s restrictive 
definition, and struck down the ordinance because it involved people who 
had a blood relationship to one another.66 The plurality identified the 
constitutional right at stake as the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
due process right to personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
life, including family living arrangements.67 The plurality determined 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 15–16 (“The choice of household companions—of whether a person’s 
‘intellectual and emotional needs’ are best met by living with family, friends, professional 
associates, or others—involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of 
intimate relationships within the home.”). 
 60. Id. at 18. 
 61. Id. at 18–19.  
 62. Id. at 19–20. 
 63. 431 U.S. 494, 495–96 (1977). 
 64. See id. at 496 & n.2 (noting that the ordinance recognized only a few categories of 
related individuals as a “family”). 
 65. See id. at 496–97. 
 66. Id. at 498–99 (“East Cleveland . . . has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing 
by slicing deeply into the family itself. . . . When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of 
the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; the usual deference to the legislature is 
inappropriate.”). 
 67. Id. at 499. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate concurrence in which he found 
the ordinance unconstitutional as a matter of property law. Id. at 513, 521 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Specifically, he believed that prohibiting the owner’s use of her property in this manner “cuts so 
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that the ordinance could not survive the higher level of scrutiny, making 
many of the same arguments that Justice Marshall made in his Belle Terre 
dissent: that numerical occupancy limits and restrictions on vehicles are 
the best ways to discourage overcrowding and traffic, and that attempts 
to regulate the relationships of household occupants serve these goals 
“marginally, at best.”68 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s only two pronouncements on the subject 
of single-family zoning stake out two very different points on the 
constitutional continuum: On one side, unrelated people have no right to 
live together and no real redress against zoning laws that prohibit them 
from doing so. On the other side, people who are legally or biologically 
related, whether in a nuclear family or not, have a substantive due process 
right to live together and zoning laws that would interfere with this right 
are subject to strict scrutiny.  
2.  State Courts 
While the issue is settled as a matter of federal law (for now), a 
number of state courts have heard challenges to restrictive single-family 
ordinances brought under their state constitutions.69 Most have upheld 
such zoning ordinances based on the reasoning that they were rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest—usually the need to control 
population density.70 Their use of the rational basis test signaled the 
courts’ belief that no fundamental rights were at stake. Some went so far 
as to expressly state that there was no “governmental interest in keeping 
together a group of unrelated persons.”71 If associational rights were 
                                                                                                                     
deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of residential property” 
that it constituted a taking. Id. at 520–21. 
 68. Id. at 499–500, 500 n.7. This holding did not prevent municipalities from enacting 
ordinances that restricted extended families from living together. In the 1990s and 2000s, a 
number of municipalities introduced such ordinances in an apparent attempt to prevent Latino 
immigrants, who are more likely to live in extended families, from settling in their neighborhoods. 
See Daniel Eduardo Guzmán, Note, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing 
Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 416–21 (2010) 
(describing ordinances in Georgia and Virginia that sought to redefine family by limiting extended 
family members); see also McCrummen, supra note 3.  
 69. For an excellent and thorough summary of every state’s treatment of family-definition 
ordinances, see Adam Lubow, “. . . Not Related by Blood, Marriage, or Adoption”: A History of 
the Definition of “Family” in Zoning Law, Student Writing Competition Paper, 16 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING 144 (2007). 
 70. See, e.g., Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706, 710 (N.H. 1975); State 
v. Champoux, 566 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Neb. 1997); City of Brookings v. Winker, 554 N.W.2d 827, 
831–32 (S.D. 1996). As discussed supra, this rationale confuses single-family zoning with the 
numerical occupancy limits commonly found in property maintenance codes. 
 71. City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); see also White 
Enters., 348 A.2d at 709 (“The State has no particular interest in keeping together a certain group 
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invoked, these courts usually summarily dismissed such arguments with 
a reference to Belle Terre72 or took an approach similar to that in Moore, 
which recognized the right to associate within the home but limited it to 
related individuals.73  
A handful of state courts came out the other way. Most of these did 
not take the step of striking down restrictive single-family ordinances 
entirely but instead simply refused to apply them to the group at issue. 
These courts invariably did so after determining that there was no 
significant difference between the group of unrelated people seeking to 
live together and a group of related people. For example, State v. Baker74 
involved an ordained minister and his family who took a single mother 
and her children into their home.75 City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson76 
involved a group of unrelated people who cooked together, shared 
household chores and home maintenance expenses, vacationed together, 
and had a fair degree of stability in their living arrangement.77 Both 
households at issue operated in all material respects like families. 
Once reaching this conclusion, these courts could find no rational 
reason for a zoning law to distinguish between the two basically 
equivalent groups.78 Thus, most of these courts relied on equal protection 
reasoning without ever recognizing a fundamental right of intimate 
                                                                                                                     
of unrelated persons. The State has a clear interest, however, in preserving the integrity of the 
biological or legal family.”). 
 72. See, e.g., City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge v. Myers, 145 So.3d 320, 332, 
335–36 (La. 2014). A notable exception is McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 719 
S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 2011), in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina dismissed a challenge to 
a restrictive single-family ordinance that had been brought on the grounds that it violated the due 
process clause of South Carolina’s state constitution. Id. at 661. The Court specifically noted that 
“the freedom to select one’s cohabitants could, under some circumstances, implicate the freedom 
of association guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” but refused 
to decide the issue because that argument was not before it. Id. at 661 n.1.  
 73. For example, in Rosenberg v. City of Boston, the court held that the right of intimate 
association only covers affiliations that center on family. No. 08 MISC 377101(CWT), 2010 WL 
2090956, at *9 (Mass. Land Ct. May 25, 2010). Thus, the court concluded, a person’s right to 
cohabitate with relatives is protected, but she has no right to choose living companions who are 
not related to her. See id.; see also Doe v. City of Butler, Pa., 892 F.2d 315, 316, 321 (3d Cir. 
1989) (holding that a single-family zoning ordinance preventing more than six victims of domestic 
violence from living together in a shelter did not interfere with their right to associate with one 
another because associational rights do not extend to living with nonrelatives). 
 74. 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979).  
 75. Id. at 370.  
 76. 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980).  
 77. Id. at 438. 
 78. See, e.g., Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831, 840–41 (Mich. 1984) 
(involving related and unrelated coresiding members of a religious nonprofit organization); Baer 
v. Town of Brookhaven, 537 N.E.2d 619, 619 (N.Y. 1989) (involving five unrelated elderly 
women). 
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association within the home.79 A few of these courts did articulate (at 
least in dicta) a high degree of skepticism about zoning ordinances that 
regulate the nature of the relationship between household members.80  
There are a few examples of courts striking down ordinances entirely 
on due process grounds. For example, in Holy Name Hospital v. 
Montroy,81 the court invalidated a single-family ordinance that would 
have prevented small groups of nuns from living together in Teaneck, 
New Jersey.82 Similarly, DiStefano v. Haxton83 struck down a restrictive 
single-family ordinance on both due process and equal protection 
grounds.84 Regarding due process, the court made clear that the plaintiffs 
had a liberty interest to choose their own apartment-mates and 
housemates, and there was no compelling reason for the government to 
interfere with this right.85 
D.  The Fair Housing Act 
In 1988, Congress amended the federal Fair Housing Act to protect 
two new characteristics: familial status and disability.86 This created 
additional avenues for challenging restrictive single-family ordinances. 
To the extent that these types of cases are now dealt with statutorily, they 
are beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a brief description 
might be useful to help the reader distinguish between restrictive single-
family zoning challenges, which are based on the Fair Housing Act, and 
those that rely on the Constitution and the right to associate.  
“Familial status,” as defined by the Act, refers to a child under the age 
of eighteen living within the home of a parent or custodial guardian.87 
The custodian category includes foster parents, temporary guardians, and 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See, e.g., Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 838 (agreeing with the Belle Terre Court’s refusal to 
recognize such a fundamental right and finding Belle Terre “to be clear authority for the 
proposition that to limit residentially zoned property to a traditional family and a number of non-
related persons is permissible under the United States Constitution”). 
 80. Santa Barbara, 610 P.2d 436, at 441–42 (stating that “zoning ordinances are much less 
suspect when they focus on the use than when they command inquiry into who are the users” 
(emphasis omitted)); Baker, 405 A.2d at 371 (opining that zoning should never “be used as a tool 
to regulate the internal composition of housekeeping units”). 
 81. 379 A.2d 299 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). 
 82. Id. at 187–89. The court noted that with 90% of the Township zoned for single families, 
Teaneck was effectively operating as a “private club” to which “application for admission must 
be accompanied by a validated marriage certificate.” Id. at 187. 
 83. C.A. No. WC 92-0589, 1994 WL 931006 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1994). 
 84. Id. at *7–8, *14. 
 85. Id. at *7. 
 86. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-430, § 6(b)(1)–(2) 102 Stat. 1619, 
1622 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3606 (1988)). The previously existing protected 
characteristics were race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3606 
(1982). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2012). 
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those in the process of obtaining legal recognition of their relationship.88 
This coverage is broader than the definition of relatedness used in 
restrictive single-family ordinances, which require an existing biological 
or adoptive relationship. As a result, restrictive single-family ordinances, 
which would prevent families from taking in foster children or otherwise 
serving as guardians for children to whom they are not biologically 
related, now violate the Fair Housing Act.89  
The addition of disability as a protected characteristic was intended to 
address direct discrimination against disabled home-seekers as well as 
land-use restrictions on group homes for the disabled.90 “Group homes” 
is an umbrella term commonly used to describe communal facilities that 
allow disabled people to live together within a residential, as opposed to 
an institutional setting.91 The statute expressly prohibits the refusal to 
make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or 
services, when such an accommodation is necessary for a disabled person 
to live in a dwelling.92 Ordinances that require household members to be 
related are just the sort of “rules” from which group home residents might 
require an accommodation in order to live together. As a result, restrictive 
single-family ordinances, which interfere with the ability of such homes 
to operate, may be subject to challenge under the Fair Housing Act.93 
Finally, the Fair Housing Act has been the basis for challenges to 
municipalities that have used overly narrow family definitions or overly 
restrictive occupancy codes in a deliberate attempt to keep out particular 
ethnic groups who are more likely to live in large, extended families. For 
example, in the 1990s and 2000s, a number of municipalities introduced 
narrow family definition ordinances in an apparent attempt to prevent 
Hispanic households, which are more likely to contain extended family 
members, from settling in their neighborhoods.94 Also, in 1997, the 
Department of Justice filed suit against the Town of Cicero, Illinois, 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See id.  
 89. With the addition of protection for familial status, the Fair Housing Act included a 
specific provision allowing housing providers to impose reasonable numerical occupancy 
limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1). Thus, even though familial status is a protected category, 
a biological, adoptive, or foster family still may be prevented from living in a dwelling that is too 
small for the number of people in the household. 
 90. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 
(Jan. 23, 1989); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-711 (1988), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 1988 
WL 169871, at *13, 17–18.  
 91. 2 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:24 (describing group homes as “small 
residential facilities, often organized like families, which provide valuable social services”). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). 
 93. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 (1995); Keys 
Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, Kan., 248 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001); Groome Res., 
Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 195–97 (5th Cir. 2000); Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of 
Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 784–86 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 94. See Guzmán, supra note 68. 
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alleging that it had adopted an extremely strict numerical occupancy 
standard in an attempt to prevent Hispanic families, which tend to be 
larger, from moving there.95 Arguably, the municipal policies in both 
situations—an overly narrow family definition and an overly restrictive 
occupancy code—while facially neutral, create a disparate adverse 
impact on a particular national origin group.96 
II.  THE RIGHT OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
This Part traces the origins and development of the Supreme Court’s 
associational-rights jurisprudence, noting the Court’s inconsistency with 
respect to the sources and justifications of the right to associate. 
A.  Purposes and Constitutional Origins 
There is no “right to association”—intimate or otherwise—
specifically set forth within the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has identified this right in a number of cases and a variety of 
contexts. As with the development of its privacy jurisprudence, which 
overlaps significantly with associational rights, the Court has relied upon 
multiple constitutional sources and justifications to ground its protection 
of the right to associate. Often, the purpose and parameters of the right 
vary according to context and the type of association at issue. As a result, 
while some sort of a right clearly exists, it remains poorly understood and 
inconsistently recognized.97 In particular, as discussed below, a tension 
has arisen between the desire to protect particular types of intimate 
associations based on a value judgment of the relationship at issue (a 
“relationship” rationale), a desire not to discriminate between certain 
types of similar relationships (an “equal protection” rationale), and a 
desire to protect individual autonomy when it comes to decision-making 
about intimate associations, regardless of the nature of the relationship 
involved (a “liberty” rationale).98  
1.  Early Cases 
The first case to specifically recognize a right to associate was NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,99 which involved the State of Alabama’s 
                                                                                                                     
 95. United States v. Town of Cicero, Ill., No. 93 C 1805, 1997 WL 337379, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
June 16, 1997).  
 96. See id. at *2–4; Guzmán, supra note 68. 
 97. Collin O’Connor Udell, Student Article, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid 
Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 239–40 (1998). See generally John D. Inazu, The Unsettling 
“Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 (2010). 
 98. These categories are similar to the foundations of privacy law articulated by Professor 
Kendall Thomas, who also identifies a “Zonal Paradigm” (similar to the spatial privacy analysis 
discussed infra Section II.B), a “Relational Paradigm,” and a “Decisional Paradigm.” Kendall 
Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1443–48 (1992). 
 99. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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attempts to require the NAACP to divulge the names and home addresses 
of its members.100 The Court noted that group association was often an 
important mechanism for political advocacy and other expressions of 
belief.101 Thus, it recognized a “freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas” rooted in the First Amendment.102 
Seven years later, the Court addressed state encroachment on a 
different sort of association, one that did not exist for expressive or 
political purposes. In Griswold v. Connecticut103 the Court reviewed a 
state law that prohibited the use or provision of contraceptives applied 
against a physician who prescribed contraceptives to a married woman.104 
After famously noting that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance,”105 Justice Douglas observed that the case at 
hand “concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”106 While the marital 
relationship was different from the other sorts of associations that the 
Court had found worthy of protection,107 it was no less important:  
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our 
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or 
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, 
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a 
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is 
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.108  
Thus, Griswold grounded associational rights in the need to protect the 
privacy of a particular sort of intimate relationship—marriage—that is 
deeply rooted in our history and traditions as a society.  
The Court moved away from this emphasis on privacy and traditional 
relationships in its next contraception case, Eisenstadt v. Baird,109 which 
struck down a ban on contraception use by unmarried women.110 Justice 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. at 451. For a thorough discussion of this case and its role in the early development 
of the doctrine of associational rights, see generally John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the 
Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010). 
 101. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.  
 102. See id.  
 103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 104. Id. at 480. 
 105. Id. at 484.  
 106. Id. at 485. 
 107. See, e.g., id. at 483.  
 108. Id. at 486.  
 109. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).  
 110. Id. at 454–55. 
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William Brennan initially approached the issue as one of equal 
protection, arguing that the state had failed to articulate a rational basis 
for distinguishing between married people and unmarried people when it 
came to prohibiting access to contraception.111 He then squarely 
addressed the right of intimate association, transforming it from a right 
meant to protect a particular type of relationship into one that shields 
individuals in their decision-making about intimate matters:112  
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question 
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is 
not an independent entity with a mind and a heart of its own, 
but an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.113  
Hence, with Eisenstadt the emphasis in associational privacy shifted 
toward individual autonomy and away from the specific nature of the 
intimate relationship at issue.  
Another case of note from the early 1970s is United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.114 The Moreno Court was asked to 
consider a provision in the Food Stamp Act that excluded households 
from participation in the program if they contained any unrelated 
people.115 Justice Brennan’s majority opinion treated the issue as one of 
equal protection between households with related members and unrelated 
members.116 Justice Brennan did not treat the households with unrelated 
people as a suspect class or the act of living together as a fundamental 
right. Instead, applying rational basis review, he found that the statute’s 
classification failed to further any legitimate government interest.117  
More significant for purposes of this discussion is Justice Douglas’s 
concurring opinion, in which he argued that the real issue was the 
plaintiffs’ right to associate within their homes:  
This case involves desperately poor people with acute 
problems who, though unrelated, come together for mutual 
help and assistance. The choice of one’s associates for 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Id. at 443, 446–47.  
 112. Inazu, supra note 97, at 161.  
 113. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis omitted). 
 114. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 115. Id. at 529.  
 116. Id. at 532–34.  
 117. See id. at 538. 
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social, political, race, or religious purposes is basic in our 
constitutional scheme. . . . 
 . . . As the facts of this case show, the poor are 
congregating in households where they can better meet the 
adversities of poverty. This banding together is an 
expression of the right of freedom of association that is very 
deep in our traditions.118 
Having identified the right to choose one’s living companions as a 
fundamental one, Justice Douglas, who would write the majority opinion 
in Belle Terre just one year later,119 argued that any government 
classification between related and unrelated people curtailing that right 
had to satisfy strict scrutiny.120 Thus, his reasoning relies on both 
recognition of the liberty aspect of the right to associate within the home 
and an equal protection argument about related versus unrelated groups. 
There is another important line of cases here that bears mentioning: 
the early public accommodations cases.121 Although the courts did not 
frame their analysis as addressing associational rights, these cases 
invariably turned on whether the establishment was considered public or 
private, with private groups being given considerably more latitude to 
discriminate.122 By focusing on the private/public divide in the right to 
exclude, the courts were implicitly acknowledging a right of private 
group members to freely associate with one another. Justice Arthur 
Goldberg’s concurrence in Bell v. Maryland,123 a lunch-counter sit-in 
case that raised the issue of whether enforcement of private acts of 
segregation can constitute state action,124 set forth the issues cogently: 
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the 
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club 
to any person or to choose his social intimates and business 
partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices including 
race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private 
association are themselves constitutionally protected 
liberties.125 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 119. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974). 
 120. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 543–45.  
 121. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431, 432, 434–35 
(1973) (considering whether a community pool was a private club); Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234–36 (1969) (considering whether a community park was a private 
social club); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 300–01 (1969) (considering whether a recreational 
facility was private). 
 122. E.g., Tillman, 410 U.S. at 438–39 (holding that a community pool was not a private 
club and thus was not exempt from the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2012)). Under 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a(e), private clubs are exempt from the general prohibition against discrimination 
or segregation in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a), (e). 
 123. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
 124. Id. at 227–28 (majority opinion); id. at 310–11 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 313 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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2.  The Modern Framework 
The concept of a specific right to intimate association gained 
significant traction in 1980, when Professor Kenneth Karst published his 
influential article, The Freedom of Intimate Association.126 Professor 
Karst noted from the outset that many of the Court’s recent decisions on 
matters ranging from marriage, divorce, childrearing, and reproduction, 
which were grounded variously on equal protection as well as substantive 
and procedural due process rights, were in fact all “variations on a single 
theme: the freedom of intimate association.”127  
Professor Karst defined intimate association as “a close and familiar 
personal relationship with another that is in some significant way 
comparable to a marriage or family relationship.”128 He identified four 
values of intimate association that justify its constitutional protection: (1) 
society (as in, companionship), which includes access of one person to 
another particular person’s physical presence; (2) caring and 
commitment; (3) intimacy (defined as a type of close and enduring 
association between people); and (4) self-identification (a variant on self-
expression).129 He also advocated the use of a sliding scale standard of 
review for intimate association cases, with the level of scrutiny increasing 
with the presence of particular values.130  
In 1984, the Supreme Court handed down Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees,131 an opinion that seems written with Professor Karst’s article in 
mind. The issue was whether state antidiscrimination law could force the 
Jaycees, a private organization, to admit women.132 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Brennan began by noting, as Professor Karst had, that the Court 
had actually developed two overlapping strands of associational rights: 
the right of expressive association (“the right to associate for the purpose 
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment”) and 
the right of intimate association (“choices to enter into and maintain 
certain intimate human relationships”).133  
As to the source and object of the right of intimate association, Justice 
Brennan’s opinion is hardly a model of clarity. On one hand, he described 
the right as a fundamental element of personal liberty, arguing that 
protecting intimate relationships from unwarranted state interference 
“safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
 127. Id. at 625. 
 128. Id. at 629. 
 129. Id. at 630–37. 
 130. Id. at 676. 
 131. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 132. Id. at 612.  
 133. Id. at 617–18. 
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central to any concept of liberty.”134 On the other hand, he articulated a 
somewhat contradictory dual purpose for the right, as protecting both 
traditional institutions and diversity: “[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds 
have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster 
diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power 
of the State.”135  
Justice Brennan went on to discuss the types of associations that 
should be accorded constitutional protection, which unsurprisingly 
included family, marriage, childbirth, and childrearing.136 “Family 
relationships,” he reasoned, involve the sharing not only of “thoughts, 
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one’s 
life.”137 He recognized, however, that it was not the legal or biological 
relationship per se that led to this level of intimacy, but the fact that such 
relationships involve relatively few people, are highly selective, and are 
secluded in critical respects from others.138 As a result, other relationships 
with similar qualities could also be considered sufficiently intimate to 
warrant constitutional protection. Justice Brennan therefore advocated 
using the objective factors that tend to distinguish families—size, 
purpose, selectivity, and seclusion among others—as a yardstick for 
assessing whether other types of associations should be protected. 
Applying these factors, the Court found that the Jaycees were not an 
intimate enough group to invoke their associational rights in order to 
exclude women.139  
Despite Justice Brennan’s rhetorical nod to the relationships that have 
been critical to the “culture and traditions of the Nation,”140 Roberts’s 
main doctrinal contribution was to identify the level of intimacy in a 
relationship as the operative factor for constitutional protection, and to 
measure that level of intimacy using the fairly objective criteria of size, 
purpose, selectivity, and seclusion.141 Subsequent cases applied these 
criteria to various types of associations, usually finding them not intimate 
enough to be protected against government intrusion.142  
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 618–19. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 619.  
 137. Id. at 619–20. 
 138. See id. at 620. 
 139. Id. at 621.  
 140. Id. at 618–19. 
 141. See id. at 619–20. Professor John Inazu criticizes the approach set forth by Justice 
Brennan and Professor Karst, arguing that they fail to articulate a defensible rationale for how 
they distinguish between protected and unprotected associations. Inazu, supra note 97, at 161–62. 
Many of the qualities that they assume make intimate associations worthy of protection may be 
present in nonintimate associations, and not all intimate associations actually have the 
characteristics that make them worthy of protection. Id. at 162–64. 
 142. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1989) (concluding that a public 
dance hall with up to 1000 patrons on a given night was not a site of intimate associations); Bd. 
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Similarly, although Justice Brennan included “purpose” as one of the 
criteria, value judgments about the quality of, nature of, or reason for the 
particular intimate association at issue do not typically factor into the 
analysis. Instead, the “purpose” criterion seems to stand only as a 
measure to evaluate whether the reason for a group’s existence is 
incompatible with government interference. For example, in Board of 
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte143 (Duarte), 
the Court noted the following:  
The purpose of Rotary “is to produce an inclusive, not 
exclusive, membership, making possible the recognition of 
all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a 
true cross section of the business and professional life of the 
community.” The membership undertakes a variety of 
service projects designed to aid the community, to raise the 
standards of the members’ businesses and professions, and 
to improve international relations. Such an inclusive 
“fellowship for service based on diversity of interest,” 
however beneficial to the members and to those they serve, 
does not suggest the kind of private or personal relationship 
to which we have accorded protection under the First 
Amendment.144 
Thus the “purpose” question is not whether the group should be free 
of governmental interference because the Court approves of the group’s 
purpose—indeed in Duarte the Court appears to hold the Rotary’s 
purpose in high regard while at the same time denying the group’s 
associational arguments. Rather, what matters is whether this purpose is 
incompatible with government interference.  
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas145 is a significant exception to the 
Court’s “non-judgmental” approach to the purpose prong. In that case the 
Court considered multiple challenges to a set of zoning and licensing 
restrictions that the City of Dallas had applied to adult-oriented 
businesses.146 A group of people who owned hotels that rented out rooms 
by the hour challenged a regulation setting a ten-hour minimum for hotel 
stays.147 The hotel owners cited Roberts in arguing that the regulations 
                                                                                                                     
of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987) (concluding that 
local Rotary Clubs, with an upper range of 900 members, that carry on a variety of public activities 
and admit all qualified applicants are not sufficiently intimate to warrant protection as an intimate 
association). 
 143. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 144. Id. at 546–47 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 1 ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY, FOCUS ON 
ROTARY 60–61 (1981)). 
 145. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).  
 146. Id. at 220–21.  
 147. Id. at 236–37.  
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burdened their patrons’ right to engage in intimate associations—
presumably the sexual activity that would occur in the hotel rooms.148 
Rather than looking to the (unquestionable) intimacy of the associations 
at issue, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion focused on the 
purpose and nature of the associations, and the fact that they were not the 
sort of traditional relationships that justified protection: 
[W]e do not believe that [the regulations] will have any 
discernible effect on the sorts of traditional personal bonds 
to which we referred in Roberts. Any “personal bonds” that 
are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 
hours are not those that have “played a critical role in the 
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and 
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.”149  
With the exception of FW/PBS, the modern approach to intimate 
association, with its focus on objective measures of group intimacy, 
appears in many ways to harken back to the early public accommodations 
cases, which focused on the divide between public and private conduct.150 
Even though technically “private” in the sense that they are not 
government actors or public accommodations, large groups that carry on 
activities in public spaces, that have “public seeming” purposes involving 
civic, social, and economic participation, and that are open to significant 
segments of the public will likely not be found intimate enough to invoke 
associational rights.  
B.  Housing and Privacy 
Throughout the last century, a separate but related strand of privacy 
case law has taken shape in the area of the Fourth Amendment and 
residential searches and seizures. Although a complete discussion of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is outside the scope of this Article, the 
Court’s specific treatment of the home as a focus of “spatial privacy” is 
relevant here. As many courts and commentators have noted, the home 
occupies an almost sacred space in the American psyche and American 
history. This, in turn, has led the courts to be extremely protective of 
residential spaces against governmental interference, as compared to 
other spaces such as automobiles, schools, or the workplace—solicitude 
that has been described as “housing exceptionalism.”151  
                                                                                                                     
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 237. 
 150. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text; see also Patrick Lofton, Comment, Any 
Club That Would Have Me as a Member: The Historical Basis for a Non-Expressive and Non-
Intimate Freedom of Association, 81 MISS. L.J. 327, 356–58 (2011) (tying the early public 
accommodations cases to modern associational rights). 
 151. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 907–08 (2010). 
25
Oliveri: Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choo
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1426 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not property,152 when determining the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection, courts tend to focus more on the privacy interests 
created by the physical home itself and less on the nature of who is inside 
or what they are doing. Put another way, “core” domestic spaces receive 
the highest level of protection regardless of whether the specific activities 
or associations at issue in a particular case are the sort that have been 
historically accorded value.153  
The arguments as to why this is so break down very much like the 
arguments discussed above for why intimate associations need 
protection; in other words, there is a relationship rationale and an 
autonomy rationale. Some commentators contend that domestic spaces 
are safeguarded because they are where interpersonal relationships, 
particularly aspects of family life like marriage and parenting, are likely 
to flourish. As Professor Stephanie Stern argues, “The physical home has 
doctrinal value in selective contexts as a proxy for substantive privacy 
and privacy of intimate association. Homes are important to privacy and 
personhood not because homes symbolize intimate ties but because they 
so frequently shelter them.”154 Thus, even if a particular residence does 
not actually provide a haven for an intimate relationship (for example, it 
is used primarily as a drug house), it is still accorded protection because 
the home is the sort of place that usually does. 
Others contend that the home holds such a significant position because 
it is a central aspect of personhood to control one’s residential space. In 
her influential work, Property and Personhood, Professor Margaret 
Radin argues that “to achieve proper self-development—to be a person—
an individual needs some control over resources in the external 
environment.”155 The home is particularly important because of “the 
feeling that it would be an insult for the state to invade one’s home 
because it is the scene of one’s history and future, one’s life and growth. 
In other words, one embodies or constitutes oneself there.”156 Professor 
Radin recognized that when the property interests of a group are involved, 
personhood intersects with the freedom of association because “group 
cohesion may be important or even necessary to personhood.”157 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the personhood aspect of the analysis remains 
                                                                                                                     
 152. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 153. Indeed, this must be so, as the most common mechanism for a Fourth Amendment 
challenge is a motion to suppress, which will only be sustained when there is evidence of illegal 
activity.  
 154. Stern, supra note 151, at 950. 
 155. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) 
(emphasis omitted).  
 156. Id. at 992.  
 157. See id. at 1011–12. 
26
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/8
2015] THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE HOUSEHOLD COMPANIONS 1427 
 
the cornerstone; the relationship or group membership is merely one way 
for the individual to realize his or her personhood. 
Regardless of which rationale grounds the concept of spatial privacy 
within the home, the law recognizes this as a powerful interest that should 
not be intruded upon lightly. Arguments about spatial privacy have not 
often arisen in the context of zoning, for the simple reason that most 
zoning regulations do not seek to regulate what goes on, or who lives, 
inside the home, but the concept is clearly relevant to restrictive single-
family ordinances. 
C.  Recent Legal Developments  
A handful of recent cases provide support for a right of intimate 
association within the home, and they ground this support in a liberty or 
decisional autonomy rationale. The most significant of these is Lawrence 
v. Texas,158 which struck down a state law that criminalized homosexual 
sodomy.159 The plaintiffs in the case were two men accused of engaging 
in sexual acts while inside one of the men’s apartment.160 Although it did 
not explicitly frame the case as one of associational rights, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion recognized a right to intimate 
conduct grounded in the exercise of liberty under the Due Process Clause. 
“Liberty,” he argued, “presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”161 
This right is particularly strong, he reasoned, when the government is 
seeking to regulate activity that takes place within the home.162 People 
are, for the most part, at liberty to choose their sexual partners and the 
choice is highly personal.163 Therefore, Justice Kennedy cautioned 
against “attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the 
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of 
an institution the law protects.”164 “[A]dults,” Justice Kennedy continued, 
“may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes 
and their own private lives.”165  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit more directly 
affirmed the right to freedom of choice in roommates in Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com.166 In that case, an 
                                                                                                                     
 158. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 159. Id. at 578. 
 160. Id. at 562–63.  
 161. Id. at 562.  
 162. See id. (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a 
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.”). 
 163.  Id. at 567.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id.  
 166. 666 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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online roommate locator service required users to disclose their sex, 
sexual orientation, familial status, and those characteristics they preferred 
in a roommate. 167 A fair housing advocacy group alleged that the 
defendant violated state and federal fair housing laws by collecting this 
information and then sorting, steering, and matching users based on those 
characteristics.168  
The court concluded that the fair housing laws did not apply to the 
choice of a roommate because the right of intimate association protects 
that choice, and the roommate relationship, generally.169 The court 
applied the factors identified in Duarte—“size, purpose, selectivity, and 
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship”—
to the roommate relationship and found that they were easily met.170 The 
court went on to emphasize that the protection of privacy and 
associational rights was particularly important in the context of the home, 
and it concluded that to hold that the Fair Housing Act applied inside of 
a home or apartment “would allow the government to restrict our ability 
to choose roommates compatible with our lifestyles. This would be a 
serious invasion of privacy, autonomy and security.”171 
Finally, in Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp,172 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recognized, in dicta, that the right of 
intimate association should include the right to choose who lives in your 
home. In that case, senior citizens challenged the Fair Housing Act’s 
familial status provisions, which required their condominium complex to 
allow families with children to reside there.173 The plaintiffs argued that 
requiring their complex to accept families with children violated their 
own associational and privacy rights, which included their rights not to 
live near children.174 The court soundly rejected this argument, stating, in 
essence, that the plaintiffs had no right to control the composition of the 
families who lived near them.175 The court went on to note that the 
plaintiffs may be entitled to resist government encroachment on their 
right to choose who lived in their own homes: “If the [Fair Housing] Act 
were trying to force plaintiffs to take children into their home, this 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Id. at 1218.  
 168. Id.  
 169. See id. at 1220–23.  
 170. Id. at 1220–21 (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 
537, 546 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171. Id. at 1221. The court then vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded for an entry 
of judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1223–24.  
 172. 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992).  
 173. Id. 1032–33.  
 174. Id. at 1036.  
 175. Id. (“Whatever the penumbral right to privacy found in the Constitution might include, 
it excludes without question the right to dictate or challenge whether families with children may 
move in next door to you.”). 
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argument might have some merit. But the Act violates no privacy rights 
because it stops at [their] front door.”176  
Although none of these cases deals directly with zoning, each 
provides further support for the right of people to be free to structure their 
living arrangements, to conduct their intimate relationships within the 
walls of their dwelling place, and generally to order their “home lives” 
however they wish.  
III.  TOWARD A RIGHT OF CORESIDENCE 
This Part connects the right to associate with the right to choose one’s 
living companions, arguing that the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area leads inexorably toward recognizing such a 
right. The Part also discusses functional family reforms, concluding that 
while they are a good start, they do not go far enough to protect people’s 
liberty interests in choosing living companions. It questions whether the 
police power can really stretch far enough to authorize the regulation of 
household composition. Part III concludes with an analysis of whether 
single-family zoning can be justified under either of the prevailing 
models of local government legitimacy. 
A.  Coresidence as a Protected Association 
The decision in Belle Terre has come in for a great deal of criticism.177 
It is poorly reasoned, inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent at the 
time, and wholly incompatible with the Court’s modern view of liberty-
based associational rights. It is time for the issue to be revisited and for 
the case to be overturned. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on associational rights makes 
clear that coresidence should be viewed as a protected association. 
Applying the analytical framework set forth in Roberts leads inevitably 
to this conclusion. The Roberts criteria include “relative smallness, a high 
degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, 
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”178 With 
respect to size, virtually all roommate or housemate arrangements involve 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id.  
 177. E.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for 
Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 586 (1977); Norman Williams, Jr. & Tatyana 
Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 
73, 76–82 (1975); Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single-Family Home Ordinances: Judicial 
Perceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of Validity, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447, 
(1999); Rebecca M. Ginzburg, Note, Altering “Family”: Another Look at the Supreme Court’s 
Narrow Protection of Families in Belle Terre, 83 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); Robert J. Hartman, 
Comment, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Belle Terre Is a Nice Place to Visit—But Only 
“Families” May Live There, 8 URB. L. ANN. 193 (1974). 
 178. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).  
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relatively few people. It is the rare house or apartment that could 
comfortably (or legally, within numerical occupancy limits) 
accommodate more than twelve people179 and most will be in the four- to 
eight-person range. This is significantly smaller than the two Jaycees 
chapters at issue in Roberts, which had 430 and 400 members each.180 
Selectivity and exclusivity are also a given, in that most people who share 
dwelling space choose their coresidents, and residency is not open to all 
comers.  
Measured on the scale of intimacy, it is clear that sharing a house or 
apartment with another person is a very intimate act indeed.181 As the 
court in Roommate.com observed: 
Aside from immediate family or a romantic partner, it’s hard 
to imagine a relationship more intimate than that between 
roommates, who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, 
bathrooms, even bedrooms. . . . 
. . . The home is the center of our private lives. 
Roommates note our comings and goings, observe whom we 
bring back at night, hear what songs we sing in the shower, 
see us in various stages of undress and learn intimate details 
most of us prefer to keep private. Roommates also have 
access to our physical belongings and to our person. . . .  
Equally important, we are fully exposed to a roommate’s 
belongings, activities, habits, proclivities and way of life. 
This could include matter we find offensive (pornography, 
religious materials, political propaganda); dangerous 
(tobacco, drugs, firearms); annoying (jazz, perfume, 
frequent overnight visitors, furry pets); habits that are 
incompatible with our lifestyle (early risers, messy cooks, 
bathroom hogs, clothing borrowers).182  
Professor Karst himself recognized that “living in the same quarters” was 
an inherently intimate act and he argued that “any governmental intrusion 
on personal choice of living arrangements demands substantial 
justification.”183 
                                                                                                                     
 179. See 2012 INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE § 404.5 & tbl.404.5 (2011), 
available at https://law.resource.org/pub/us/code/ibr/icc.ipmc.2012.html (specifying minimum 
area requirements for occupants within a household under an overcrowding prohibition).  
 180. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621. The Rotary Clubs at issue in Duarte had as many as 900 
members. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987). 
 181. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from 
Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1151 (2010).  
 182. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 
1221 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 183. Karst, supra note 126, at 629, 687.  
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Lawrence puts the proverbial final nail in the coffin. Just as it 
expressly repudiated the reasoning in Bowers v. Hardwick,184 it also 
deeply undermines Belle Terre.185 Lawrence’s focus on liberty bolsters 
the associational rights that coresidents enjoy: If the state cannot intrude 
on a person’s choice of who to have sex with inside his home, why should 
it be able to interfere, without a compelling reason, with that person’s 
decision about who lives there with him?186 
B.  Functional Family Reforms 
It might be tempting to argue that the right of coresidence should 
really be a right to cohabitate, or live together as a functional family. That 
is, we should extend associational rights to groups of people that look like 
traditional families—groups with some relational ties or a family-like 
structure such as unmarried couples who are raising children together or 
biological families who live with unrelated people. Indeed, the most 
significant recent reforms fall precisely along this line.187 A number of 
ordinances now specifically define family as including unmarried 
couples and their offspring.188 Others define a “functional family” as a 
group that operates in the same manner as a family and then include it in 
the definition of family.189 Ames, Iowa has such an ordinance, which 
grants a special use permit for functional families, defined as people who 
share “a strong bond or a commitment to a single purpose; . . . Share a 
single household budget; Prepare food and eat together regularly; [and] 
                                                                                                                     
 184. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) 
(“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”).  
 185. See generally Sara L. Dunski, Note, Make Way for the New Kid on the Block: The 
Possible Zoning Implications of Lawrence v. Texas, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 847 (arguing that 
Lawrence undermines decisions like Belle Terre, which justify zoning ordinances that essentially 
regulate nontraditional activity within the home). 
 186. Critics might argue that sexual intercourse in one’s home is a more intimate act than 
simply sharing a dwelling with another person. This is true (at least with respect to physical 
intimacy), but the two are similar enough in relevant respects for this Article’s conclusion to hold. 
Specifically, both take place within the home and both involve highly personal decisions about 
how to structure one’s life. If anything, choosing to live with someone may be more significant, 
with respect to the ramifications for finances, security, and day-to-day affairs than a brief sexual 
encounter with another person—allegedly the situation at issue in Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 563. 
 187. See Dwight H. Merriam, Ozzie and Harriet Don’t Live Here Anymore: Time to Redefine 
Family, ZONING PRACTICE, Feb. 2007, at 2, 5–7 (advocating giving functional families a special 
use permit to reside in single-family neighborhoods and providing an example of this type of city 
ordinance).  
 188. After the controversy with the Shelltrack–Loving household, the City of Black Jack 
amended its family definition ordinance to include unmarried couples raising children together. 
See Norm Parish, Black Jack Revises Housing Regulation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH A1 (Aug. 
16, 2006).  
 189. See, e.g., 2 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:17. 
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Share in the work to maintain the premises.”190 Ann Arbor, Michigan has 
a similar ordinance, which defines functional family as “a group of people 
plus their offspring, having a relationship [that] is functionally equivalent 
to a family. The relationship must be of a permanent and distinct 
character with a demonstrable and recognizable bond characteristic of a 
cohesive unit.”191 
Commentators have also called for a restructuring of the associational 
rights doctrine so that it clearly applies to particular sorts of “family-like” 
and “marriage-like” relationships. In part, this is because of the way the 
doctrine has been framed from the beginning, in which the rights of the 
nuclear family are paramount, and the value of other intimate 
relationships is defined by how closely they resemble familial ones.192  
Professor Nancy Marcus advocates a sliding scale model in which the 
court’s standard of review will vary according to the closeness of the 
relationship.193 Thus, unmarried couples may be entitled to the highest 
level of protection if their relationship bears the hallmarks of marriage, 
displaying “a significant commitment through shared finances, children, 
[or] cohabitation.”194 Unmarried couples who are sexually or 
romantically intimate but not in a marriage-like relationship would be 
entitled to some lesser level of heightened scrutiny.195 Finally, other 
relationships, including friendships, would be entitled to rational basis 
review.196 
Practitioner Collin Udell similarly argues for the protection of 
“nontraditional relationships that resemble traditional relationships in the 
quality of their intimacy.”197 She calls for a three-tiered framework based 
on the relative level of intimacy, which is determined by three qualities: 
cohabitation, sexual intimacy, and commitment.198 If all three qualities 
are present—two people cohabit, are sexually intimate, and are in a long-
                                                                                                                     
 190. AMES, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 29.1503(4)(d) (2015), available at http://www.cityofames.org/ 
modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=655. 
 191. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES 5:7(4) (1996), available at 
https://www.municode.com/library/#!/mi/ann_arbor/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVZOPL_CH
55ZO_ARTIIUSRE_5_7REOC; see also BOROUGH OF INDIANA, PA., CODE § 348–1 (2014), available at 
http://ecode360.com/11884789#./13675901?&_suid=142894827658107449802580610552 (containing an 
identical definition).  
 192. Professor Karst himself defines “intimate association” to mean “a close and familiar 
personal relationship with another that is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or 
family relationship.” Karst, supra note 126, at 629.  
 193. Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First 
Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 269, 311–15 (2006). 
 194. Id. at 312–13 (emphasis added). 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 315. 
 197. Udell, supra note 97, at 269–70.  
 198. Id. at 278–79. 
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term committed relationship—strict scrutiny applies.199 If only two are 
present—people cohabit and are sexually intimate, but have no long-term 
commitment—then intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.200 And if only 
one is present—people live together but are not sexually intimate and do 
not have a long-term commitment to one another—rational basis review 
is appropriate.201 
At base, the “functional family” concept was also the driver of the 
logic state courts employed in cases like Baker, Santa Barbara, and 
Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo.202 Because each of these courts 
found that the groups at issue behaved like a family, they could find no 
justification for treating the two differently.203 Similarly, in Baer v. Town 
of Brookhaven,204 the court overturned a restrictive family ordinance as 
it applied to five elderly widows precisely because the ordinance’s 
definition of family did not include “functionally equivalent” families.205 
All of this seems like a good first step, because it eliminates the most 
obvious injustice of restrictive single-family zoning ordinances: the fact 
that groups like the Shelltrack–Loving household, who are for all intents 
and purposes a family, may be prevented from living together by an 
unnecessarily narrow definition of what family means. This approach 
also addresses the cultural argument that restrictive single-family 
ordinances privilege a particular model of family living that relatively 
well-off, heteronormative, nonminorities of a certain age are more likely 
to engage in.206 Yet, for reasons set forth more fully in the next Section, 
these reforms do not go far enough and ultimately divert attention away 
from the more important question of why any government should be able 
to condition people’s ability to live together on the particular qualities of 
their relationship to one another. 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 279.  
 200. Id.  
 201. Id.  
 202. 351 NW.2d 831 (Mich. 1984); see infra text accompanying notes 229–31.  
 203.  Supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
 204. 537 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 1989). 
 205. Id. at 619. 
 206. Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Moore refers to the “cultural myopia” of East 
Cleveland’s ordinance, arguing that:  
The line drawn by this ordinance displays a depressing insensitivity toward the 
economic and social needs of a very large part of our society.  
. . . The “extended family” that provided generations of early Americans with 
social services and economic and emotional support in times of 
hardship . . . remains not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the 
goad of brutal economic necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of 
survival—for large numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society. 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 507–08 (1977). 
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C.  The Role of Liberty 
Thus far, the major relief from strict single-family zoning has come in 
two forms: (1) Moore’s extension of associational rights to all 
biologically related people and extended families, not just nuclear family 
members; and (2) the functional family reforms, which protect unrelated 
people who resemble families. Both of these are predicated on different 
doctrinal sources for the right of intimate association. As discussed 
previously, one might look at intimate association as a three-legged stool, 
supported by the substantive due process rights and privacy accorded to 
traditionally valued relationships such as marriage and childrearing (the 
“traditional relationship” leg), equal protection for similar groups (the 
“nondiscrimination” leg), and individual autonomy (the “liberty” leg).207  
Moore clearly gains its force from the substantive due process rights 
accorded to traditionally protected relationships such as marriage and 
child rearing, in the vein of Griswold. It relies on the assumption that the 
extended family is also a valued and foundational institution in our 
society, worthy of protection from governmental interference. The 
functional family reforms are, in essence, arguments based on equal 
protection. They are premised on the notion that some groups of unrelated 
people so closely resemble legally and biologically related people that 
ordinances, which discriminate against them on that basis, are arbitrary—
very much like Justice Brennan’s view in Moreno.  
What is missing here is the third leg of the stool. Loosening the 
definition of family and broadening the concept of associational rights to 
cover extended and functional families does not go far enough. While it 
solves one problem—discrimination against nontraditional families and 
family-like groups—it fails to address the bigger issue of whether 
household composition is an appropriate subject for zoning regulation at 
all.  
In short, both Moore and the functional family reforms are inadequate 
because they ignore a much more powerful argument against single-
family zoning ordinances: the fact that such ordinances intrude into 
extremely personal decisions people make about how to structure their 
lives. This omission ties directly to a failure to recognize the liberty and 
decisional autonomy basis for the right of intimate association first 
articulated in Eisenstadt, alluded to by Justice Douglas himself in 
Moreno, and reaffirmed so robustly in Lawrence.208  
Sharing a dwelling with another person is by definition an intimate 
association worthy of protection, not because of the nature of one’s 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See supra Section II.A. 
 208. Professor Inazu speculates that the privacy/liberty side of the associational rights 
doctrine was perceived as its weakest link, and therefore Professor Karst downplayed this aspect 
in favor of the relational component of the argument. See Inazu, supra note 97, at 164–65. 
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relationship with that person (although that may certainly be part of it), 
but because the choice of whom to share living space with is such a 
personal and significant part of one’s everyday life.209 And if an 
association is intimate, then it should not be limited because of a court or 
legislature’s subjective judgment about its value, need, or importance. 
The “purpose” prong of the intimacy analysis set forth in Roberts and 
Duarte is relevant here. As discussed previously, with one exception the 
Court has not used the “purpose” criteria as a mechanism for passing 
judgment on the reasons for the association.210 Put another way, 
associations are not deemed intimate and therefore worthy of protection 
simply because the Court approves of their reason for existing. Rather, 
“purpose” seems to refer more generally to whether the reason for the 
group’s existence makes it more or less appropriate for the group to 
remain free of government interference. In the housing context this 
should lead to a simple inquiry: is this group forming for the purpose of 
residential living (as opposed to a commercial or criminal 
undertaking)?211 If the answer is “yes” and the other intimacy factors are 
met, then the group should be able to invoke associational rights against 
unwarranted government interference. The court should not investigate 
further to ask why the group is living together—whether it is because of 
love, friendship, compatibility, economic necessity, convenience, or any 
combination of the above.212 
At its core, what might seem to be a benefit of the functional family 
approach—the fact that it rejects labels for a more nuanced view of how 
people actually live—may be a detriment because it creates the potential 
for a tremendous invasion of privacy.213 In essence, it requires courts and 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See supra Section III.A. On this point this Article disagrees with Professor Tim Iglesias, 
who argues that it is only the quality of the relationship between roommates that determines 
whether they are intimate and deserving of protection. Tim Iglesias, Does Fair Housing Law 
Apply to “Shared Living Situations”? Or, the Trouble with Roommates, 22 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING 111, 126–33 (2014).  
 210. Supra Subsection II.A.2.  
 211. In a sense, this inquiry closely mirrors the “use” concept that underlies all of zoning 
law. See 1 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 1:2 (discussing the geographical division of 
localities into specific use districts—residential, business, and industrial—in early zoning codes).  
 212. Some courts are particularly dismissive of the economic reasons that people may have 
for choosing to live together. See, e.g., Stegeman v. City of Ann Arbor, 540 N.W.2d 724, 726 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“These are individuals who are sharing a house not to function as a family, 
but for convenience and economics.”). Besides failing to address the real issue of why the 
government should care how people feel about their household companions, such an attitude is 
classist in the extreme, and fails to appreciate the very real financial pressures that cause people 
to live with roommates or compel families to double up.  
 213. As one commentator has noted, “there exists no palatable alternative to bright-line 
distinctions between families and other groups. No system of individualized hearings could 
adequately predict which living units present substantial risks of community harm, nor could any 
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zoning boards to review the intimate particulars of people’s lives in order 
to determine whether they can live together.214 For example, in McMinn 
v. Town of Oyster Bay,215 four childhood friends sought to live together 
after they graduated from college.216 One of the issues at trial was 
whether the young men actually ate dinner together, and the fact that they 
did not apparently contributed to their losing.217 In Santa Barbara, the 
Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, took note of the fact that 
the household group provided “[e]motional support” to one another and 
had taken a trip to Mexico together.218 Dimenstein v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of City of Milford219 perhaps takes the cake. In determining that 
six professional hockey players who lived together did not qualify as a 
functional family, the court reasoned, “While the six hockey players are 
on the same team there is no evidence that any of them are linemates or 
defense pairs. Moreover, the Nighthawks finished with the worst record 
in the American Hockey League in the 1990/1991 season, which is not 
conducive to cohesion between team members.”220  
D.  Household Composition and the Limits of the Police Power 
Questioning whether municipalities can reach household composition 
in their zoning ordinances inevitably leads to an examination of the nature 
of the police power itself. Euclid outlined goals—public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare—that could be met by zoning laws, and gave 
municipalities wide latitude in deciding how best to serve these purposes. 
Despite this mandate, in the 1920s, local governments exercised police 
power in a much narrower manner than they do today; they were 
                                                                                                                     
such system avoid outrageous intrusiveness in gathering its information.” Ira C. Lupu, Untangling 
the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1053 (1979). 
 214. Professor Karst argues that the government cannot be in the business of evaluating 
whether any particular relationship reaches a specific threshold quality of intimacy, and therefore 
wide berth must be given around certain types of relationships likely to contain that level of 
intimacy. See Karst, supra note 126, at 688–89. This Article argues, in contrast, that the choice of 
whom to share a dwelling with is such a personal one that it should be protected from unwarranted 
government interference regardless of the quality of the relationship.  
 215. 482 N.Y.S.2d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (N.Y. 1985). 
 216. See id. at 775–76. 
 217. As a dissenting judge in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, which modified 
the trial court’s order, noted, “Although the trial court found that the four males shared occasional 
social activities, it noted that their different hours of employment precluded their sharing dinner—
an activity which, surely, is a fundamental attribute of the family unit.” Id. at 787. 
 218. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1980). But see Carroll v. 
Washington Twp. Zoning Comm’n, 408 N.E.2d 191, 193–94 (Ohio 1980) (finding that foster 
children were not sufficiently “integrated” with their foster family to constitute a functional 
family). 
 219. No. CV91 03 56 97S, 1991 WL 172850 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1991), clarified on 
reconsideration, No. CV 91 035697 S, 1991 WL 208922 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1991). 
 220. Id. at *3 n.5. One hopes that these reasons were tongue-in-cheek, although this would 
provide little comfort to the players. 
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primarily concerned with alleviating overcrowded and unventilated 
tenement apartments, ensuring basic sanitation, and keeping industrial 
pollution out of residential areas.221 In 1954, Berman v. Parker222 (with 
Justice Douglas writing for a unanimous Court) significantly broadened 
the appropriate use of the police power, from eliminating unhealthy and 
unsafe conditions to creating beautiful well-ordered spaces.223  
Municipal zoning authorities and state courts pushed this grant of 
authority to its limits when they started enacting restrictive single-family 
zoning ordinances.224 Yet courts—including the Supreme Court in Belle 
Terre—and legislatures reflexively invoke the police power to justify an 
intrusion on privacy and liberty that would be intolerable if enacted 
through any other means. As one commentator trenchantly argues:  
[Restrictive single-family] regulations provide a 
fascinating perspective into the unique powers that America 
gives to laws governing “land use.” Government cannot, of 
course, tell you what kind of car to drive, what to cook for 
dinner, whether to watch reality TV, whether to fill the living 
room with ceramic gnomes or tchotchkes, or whether to pay 
for your kid’s college education. All these things are 
considered, and rightly so, within the realm of human 
privacy and basic human freedom. But under the label of 
land use law, governments are able to tell you who to 
consider your family and who can live in your 
house. . . . Why can government be so intrusive? Because the 
neighbors might not like how you live and because they have 
pushed the local government, through civic local democracy, 
into passing a law regulating your household. It’s an 
accepted exercise of the police power.225  
                                                                                                                     
 221. Developments in the Law—Zoning, The Legitimate Objectives of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1443, 1443, 1445–46 (1978) (noting that in the 1920s zoning for health, safety, and welfare 
typically meant making sure that buildings were not overcrowded, industrial noise and odors did 
not intrude into residential spaces, and adequate light and air could enter urban dwellings).  
 222. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  
 223. Id. at 32–33 (“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power 
to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. . . . 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as 
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 224. As Professor Gregory Richards notes, “In general, many of the broad range of zoning 
goals associated with traditional family ordinances—notably those of protecting the community 
character, aesthetics, and promoting abstract notions associated with family life—are rather far 
removed from the explicit concerns of the founders of zoning.” J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for 
Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 781.  
 225. PAUL BOUDREAUX, THE HOUSING BIAS: RETHINKING LAND USE LAWS FOR A DIVERSE 
NEW AMERICA 50 (2011). 
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However broad it may be, the police power is neither limitless nor 
extra-constitutional. As discussed above, if a municipal action burdens a 
constitutional right then it must meet heightened scrutiny, and many of 
the most commonly cited reasons for restrictive single-family ordinances 
fail under this level of scrutiny. Even actions that receive minimal 
scrutiny and judicial deference cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable and 
must be motivated by something more than animus and stereotypes. In 
particular, without some check, the vague “general welfare” and 
“community character” objectives often invoked to justify restrictive 
single-family ordinances can serve as a guise for discrimination, create 
oppressive homogeneity, and serve as a vehicle for invidious stereotypes 
that bear no tangible relationship to land use.226 The rest of this Section 
will focus on three arguments that undermine the core assumptions 
behind the use of the police power to regulate household composition. 
1.  Problems with Stereotyping  
Moreno itself cautioned that “a bare [legislative] desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group” could not justify a statute.227 A number of 
state courts have held that zoning measures must be based on specific, 
demonstrable consequences from a particular type of use, not on 
generalizations about certain types of people.228 And yet the arguments 
for restrictive single-family ordinances frequently indicate that this is 
exactly what is happening.  
For example, in Dinolfo, an amicus brief filed by the Michigan 
Townships Association in support of a restrictive single-family ordinance 
argued that “[t]he purpose of such regulations is to prohibit the influx of 
informal residential groups of people whose primary inclination is toward 
the enjoyment of a licentious style of living.”229 It went on to warn, 
without any evidence, that failure to regulate household composition will 
allow “college fraternities, ‘hippie’ communes, motorcycle clubs, and 
assorted loosely structured groups of people associating for the purpose 
of enjoying a purely licentious style of living to locate at will in 
                                                                                                                     
 226. See The Legitimate Objectives of Zoning, supra note 221, at 1451–52. 
 227. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 228. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 375 (N.J. 1979) (holding that “municipalities 
may not condition residence upon the number of unrelated persons present within the household” 
because “[g]iven the availability of less restrictive alternatives, such regulations are insufficiently 
related to the perceived social ills which they were intended to ameliorate”). As the court in State 
v. Baker went on to note, “Regulations based upon biological traits or legal relationships 
necessarily reflect generalized assumptions about the stability and social desirability of 
households comprised of unrelated individuals—assumptions which in many cases do not reflect 
the real world.” Id. at 372. 
 229. Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831, 841 (Mich. 1984) (quoting amicus 
curiae). 
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settled . . . residential neighborhoods.”230 This characterization of 
unrelated households was especially bizarre in light of the fact that the 
ordinance was being enforced against two nuclear families who were 
members of a church called the Work of Christ Community and who 
sought to take fellow church members into their homes as a way of living 
out their commitment to Christianity.231  
College students are frequent targets for negative characterization. In 
Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi,232 the court heard a challenge to a 
restrictive single-family ordinance that was clearly aimed at preventing 
college students from living together.233 In defending the ordinance, the 
Borough’s Mayor compared student residency to a harmful use that 
would need to be regulated just like “toxic waste.”234 The anti-student 
sentiments were so extreme that they prompted a thoughtful passage from 
the court:  
 
The Court cannot but be disheartened at a mental climate that 
classifies college students, presumably the brightest and best 
of our society, as less worthy than toxic waste. True, they may 
have peculiar lifestyles; true, they frequently exhibit a less 
respectful attitude toward their elders than those in present 
authority would prefer and they sometimes behave in such a 
manner as to drive their elders to distraction. Yet it cannot be 
forgotten not only that they are entitled to their lifestyle as a 
matter of constitutional right, but in a few fleeting years they 
will stand in the shoes of those they now offend—those whose 
present occupancy of power is but fleeting.235 
 
Similarly, in Stegeman v. City of Ann Arbor,236 the court upheld a 
functional family ordinance against a group of students that it 
dismissively referred to as “a ragtag collection of college roommates.”237  
Just as restrictive single-family ordinances may rest on unsupported 
negative assumptions about unrelated people who live together, they may 
also gain support from an overly idealized view of related-member 
households. In Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of 
                                                                                                                     
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 834. The Plaintiff Township insisted that the common bond of the next group that 
might seek to reside there might “not [be] the Work of Christ, but the Work of Satan.” Id. at 841.  
 232. 535 A.2d 544 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff’d, 539 A.2d 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1988) (per curiam), aff’d, 568 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1990). 
 233. Id. at 544–45, 549. 
 234. Id. at 548–49. 
 235. Id. at 549. 
 236. 540 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).  
 237. Id. at 727.  
39
Oliveri: Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choo
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1440 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
Stratford,238 the court upheld a restrictive single-family ordinance on the 
following rationale: 
[Households with unrelated people] are less likely to develop 
the kind of friendly relationships with neighbors that abound 
in residential districts occupied by traditional 
families. . . . [T]hey are not likely to have children who 
would become playmates of other children living in the area. 
Neighbors are not so likely to call upon them to borrow a 
cup of sugar, provide a ride to the store, mind the family pets, 
water the plants or perform any of the countless services that 
families, both traditional and nontraditional, provide to each 
other as a result of longtime acquaintance and mutual self-
interest.239  
Distefano v. Haxton240 presents a rare example of a court confronting 
stereotyped views about unrelated groups. The city in that case had 
passed a restrictive single-family ordinance, citing the need to cut down 
on noise and unruly behavior.241 Yet it provided no evidence that 
unrelated groups were more likely to be disruptive than those in related 
households, leading the court to conclude: 
There is nothing on this record to suggest that teenagers 
living with their parents will play their Metallica or their 
Beethoven at lower decibel levels in the wee hours of the 
morning than would four unrelated monks (or nuns)—or 
unrelated widows (or widowers) or four unrelated Navy 
lieutenants. It is a strange—and unconstitutional—ordinance 
indeed that would permit the Hatfields and the McCoys to 
live in a residential zone while barring four scholars from the 
University of Rhode Island from sharing an apartment on the 
same street. 
. . . The legislation operates on the assumption that if some 
unrelated individuals sharing an apartment or house—be 
they students or otherwise are rowdy and disorderly, then all 
unrelated persons necessarily act in that fashion and must be 
barred from residential zones. Elementary logic teaches us 
that while a specie may have the qualities of the larger genus 
it inhabits, the genus does not have all the characteristics of 
each and every specie that it contains.242  
                                                                                                                     
 238. 595 A.2d 864 (Conn. 1991).  
 239. Id. at 870. 
 240. C.A. No. WC 92-0589, 1994 WL 931006 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1994). 
 241. Id. at *1, *3.  
 242. Id. at *11–12. 
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Indeed, the law on this issue is fraught with stereotyped 
pronouncements, often with moral and class overtones, which courts and 
legislators unfortunately employ in an undisciplined and unreasoned 
manner. The cases all too frequently seem to come down to whether the 
court feels sympathy with the particular group at issue—the group of 
elderly widows in Baer v. Town of Brookhaven243 or the nuns in Holy 
Name Hospital v. Montroy244 as opposed to the hockey players in 
Dimenstein v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Milford.245 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the disparity between Justice Douglas’s 
opinions in Moreno and Belle Terre. Moreno involved extremely 
sympathetic households—low income women and children, some with 
disabilities providing each other with mutual care and assistance.246 
Speaking about these groups, Justice Douglas could not have been more 
solicitous, describing them as “[p]eople who are desperately poor but 
unrelated [who] come together and join hands with the aim better to 
combat the crises of poverty,”247 and concluding that the act of “[t]aking 
a person into one’s home because he is poor or needs help or brings 
happiness to the household” is deserving of the highest level of 
constitutional protection.248 Against the objection that relaxing the 
regulations against unrelated household members could allow “unrelated 
individuals who voluntarily chose to cohabit” and “‘hippies’ or ‘hippy 
communes’” to benefit, Justice Douglas responded flatly that “the right 
to invite the stranger into one’s home is too basic in our constitutional 
regime to deal with roughshod.”249  
In Belle Terre, by contrast, Justice Douglas barely mentioned the 
people at issue except to identify them as students at the nearby State 
University at Stony Brook.250 He dismissed all of their arguments about 
free association without analysis, except to argue that the associational 
rights of the village residents were not impaired by the restrictive single-
family ordinance because they could always have unrelated people over 
to visit.251 He then spent the rest of the opinion waxing on about open 
spaces and youth values, making clear his belief that unrelated groups 
pose a threat to them, and he concluded that this vague threat easily 
justified barring the group from the Village.252  
                                                                                                                     
 243. 537 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 1989). 
 244. 379 A.2d 299 (N.J.Super Ct. Law Div. 1977). 
 245. No. CV91 03 56 97S, 1991 WL 172850 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1991), clarified on 
reconsideration, No. CV 91 035697 S, 1991 WL 208922 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1991). 
 246. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 531–32 (1973).  
 247. Id. at 543. 
 248. Id. at 542, 544–45. 
 249. Id. at 543. 
 250. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974). 
 251. Id. at 9. 
 252. Id. 
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The difference in language between the two opinions could not be 
more striking. It seems likely that at least some of this disparity stems 
from how worthy he viewed the different groups of people at issue. A 
more cynical explanation could also be that in Moreno the groups at issue 
were the urban poor, situated far from the sort of leafy suburbs that Justice 
Douglas and other middle class people would reside in. Their presence in 
an unrelated household was not disruptive to an idyllic neighborhood, 
whereas Belle Terre involved potential intrusions of unrelated groups into 
just such a place. One might wonder how Justice Douglas would have 
responded if the groups in Moreno were trying to move into the Village 
of Belle Terre. 
2.  Protection of Children and Families 
As Belle Terre’s invocation of “youth values” makes clear, the needs 
of children are often used to justify restrictive single-family ordinances. 
The above passage from Dinan, with its fear that unrelated households 
are “not likely to have children who would become playmates of other 
children living in the area” is another example.253 Similarly, in Ames 
Rental Property Ass’n v. City of Ames,254 the Supreme Court of Iowa 
upheld a single-family ordinance because it concluded that unrelated 
people “tend not to establish roots in the community nor do they provide 
playmates for their neighbors’ children.”255 
However far the police power might stretch, zoning in order to 
socially engineer neighborhoods to optimize the likelihood of playgroups 
for children seems a bridge too far. But there is a bigger problem with 
invoking the needs of children to exclude unrelated households: it 
assumes that unrelated households will not contain children, an 
assumption which is neither borne out by statistical evidence256 nor 
supported by the facts of the cases. For example, in City of Ladue v. 
Horn257 the court found that an unmarried couple with three children from 
previous relationships were not a family and had to move out of the 
seven-bedroom home they had purchased.258 In so deciding, the court 
                                                                                                                     
 253. Dinan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Stratford, 595 A.2d 864, 870 (Conn. 
1991).  
 254. 736 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 2007).  
 255. Id. at 261.  
 256. In 2012, more than 7.8 million households were comprised of cohabiting couples and 3.2 
million of these contained children. JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES 
AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012, at 20 tbl.7 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-
570.pdf [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 2012]. In 2010, over 1.3 million minors lived with people 
to whom they were not related at all. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS 
AND FAMILIES: 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf 
[hereinafter HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 2010]. 
 257. 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 258. Id. at 747, 752. 
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cited Belle Terre’s passage about the need to create zones of “family 
values [and] youth values.”259 In Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning 
Commission,260 the Ohio Supreme Court also cited Belle Terre in support 
of its ruling that the Township’s restrictive single-family zoning law 
prevented a couple from taking in foster children.261 And in State v. Baker 
zoning authorities sought to prevent two unrelated families with a total of 
six children from living together in a single-family neighborhood.262 
Indeed, most restrictive ordinances can easily be applied to exclude 
unrelated households with children.263 One need look no further than the 
plight of the Shelltrack–Loving household with its three children. The 
Columbia, Missouri ordinance provided at the beginning of this Article 
offers another example. The guidance to Columbia’s ordinance states that 
a married couple and their two children would not constitute a family if 
they lived with the wife’s sister and brother-in-law and their three 
children.264 Thus, this ordinance would exclude a household containing 
five children from a single-family zoned neighborhood. In light of this, 
any restrictive single-family ordinance that purports to protect the needs 
of children but excludes households with children should fail for want of 
rational relation to its purpose.  
It is certainly true that acting in the interest of families has long been 
an accepted goal of law in general and land-use regulation in particular.265 
Indeed, a good deal of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence centers on the need to protect families from state 
encroachment.266 Defenders of restrictive single-family zoning 
                                                                                                                     
 259. Id. at 750 (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)). 
 260. 408 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio 1980) (per curium). 
 261. Id. at 193–94. 
 262. 405 A.2d 368, 370, 375 (N.J. 1979). But see Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 
N.W.2d 831, 834, 842–44 (Mich. 1984) (declining to enforce an ordinance against two households 
which each contained “several” children and six unrelated single adults). 
 263. In the oral argument for City of Baton Rouge/Parish of Baton Rouge v. Myers, 145 So. 
3d 320 (La. 2014), counsel for the City/Parish admitted that the definition of family used by its 
ordinance would prevent foster parents and children from residing together. See id. at 341. The 
court recognized that the ordinance might prevent people from living with their foster and non-
adopted stepchildren, but refused to rule on the issue because it found that the defendant landlord 
did not have standing to raise the argument. Id. at 331 (majority opinion). 
 264. What is a Family?, supra note 42. 
 265. See 2 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:2; see also, Palo Alto Tenants Union 
v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In response to the plaintiffs’ associational-rights 
argument, the court noted the special place the family occupies in the American legal system, and 
concluded that unrelated groups were undeserving of similar protection. Id. at 911–12. “To define 
‘association’ so broadly [as to give the group the right to live together], would be to dilute the 
effectiveness of that special branch of jurisprudence which our tradition has developed to protect 
the truly vital interests of the citizenry.” Id. at 912. 
 266. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82, 484–86 (1965); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 514 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
43
Oliveri: Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choo
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1444 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
ordinances, however, take the notion a step farther, framing it as a zero-
sum game and concluding that the need to protect a particular version of 
the family unit authorizes them to exclude everyone else.267 Unless 
unrelated groups in and of themselves are demonstrably harmful to 
traditional families (and not merely assumed harmful based on 
stereotypes) or they are competing with families for scarce housing in 
residential neighborhoods, this conclusion simply does not follow.268  
If anything, the opposite is true—the protection of the domestic sphere 
that the Court has carved out in its privacy and intimate association cases 
should caution against governmental interference with any domestic 
arrangement. As Professor Frank Michelman argues, “when we consider 
that a main pillar [in our Constitutional structure] is the first amendment, 
an inference that governments are not only constitutionally bound to 
respect traditional household forms, but are also constitutionally 
authorized to censor nontraditional ones, becomes problematic to say the 
least.”269  
3.  Theories of Local Government Legitimacy 
The police power derives much of its force from the notion that local 
governments are uniquely capable of addressing certain local issues like 
what speed limit to set in town or where to locate a shopping center. On 
questions like these, local governments are much better than larger, more 
remote units of government at identifying problems and responding to the 
                                                                                                                     
See generally David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529 (2008) 
(examining the judicial trend of broadening constitutional protection of rights for families).  
 267. This was made explicit in the brief filed before the Louisiana Supreme Court by the 
City/Parish in support of Baton Rouge’s restrictive ordinance: “It might be said that the purpose 
of a single family zone is to get away from [non-traditional] families.” Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant, City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 145 So. 3d 320 (La. 2014) (No. 2013 
CA 2011), 2014 WL 1673329, at *10, *12. 
 268. A parallel can be drawn here to the recent controversy over same-sex marriage. 
Opponents of marriage equality often argue that recognition of gay marriage will harm traditional 
marriage, yet they are hard pressed to provide concrete evidence of any tangible harm that will 
actually occur. Professor Courtney Joslin recounts, in a hearing in the case of Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, that “Judge Vaughn Walker asked Charles Cooper, counsel for the parties 
defending the constitutionality of California’s marriage ban (Proposition 8), how permitting same-
sex couples to marry would ‘harm opposite-sex marriage.’ Cooper responded: ‘Your honor, my 
answer is: I don’t know, I don’t know.’” Courtney G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2011) (quoting 
Transcript of Proceedings at 23, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(No. C 09-2292-VRW)) (internal citations marks omitted); see also Wilkinson III & White, supra 
note 177, at 624 (“Where vindication of lifestyle diversity can be shown to damage so basic an 
institution as the family, courts should not order it. The difficulty comes in the showing. The 
withdrawal of law from certain areas of moral choice does not inevitably portend a collapse of the 
social order.”). 
 269. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing 
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 193 (1977–1978). 
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preferences of their citizenry. Thus, it may be useful to analyze restrictive 
single-family ordinances through the lens of the two most commonly-
accepted theoretical models of local government authority, the public 
choice model and the community self-definition/participation model.  
Professor Charles Tiebout set forth the public choice model in his 
seminal article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.270 This theory 
views local government as the optimal means for communities to 
maximize majoritarian preferences for taxation levels, service delivery, 
and regulation.271 This leads to community homogeneity as people sort 
themselves according to the community that best suits their preferences, 
with a corresponding level of efficiency as externalities are minimized.272 
Central to this model is the assumption that a multiplicity of municipal 
governments allows for a great deal of choice and that people—referred 
to by Tiebout as “consumer-voters”—are free to move around to find the 
best fit.273  
The public choice model does a poor job of justifying restrictive 
single-family ordinances. First, the theory is grounded in mobility—it 
only works if people easily move out of communities that no longer meet 
their needs. One reason supporters frequently offer for restrictive single-
family ordinances, however, is the desire to reduce transience and 
promote neighborhood stability. People generally transition through 
different phases of life—single adulthood, married life with children, 
divorce, empty nesting, retirement, and aging. A person may wish to stay 
in her community throughout all of these life stages, but may need to live 
with others in order to make this economically feasible. The notion that 
a person who is happy where she resides would have to exit her 
community because it disapproves of her household composition actually 
forces a transience that might not otherwise exist.  
This leads to a related and more significant objection: Restrictive 
single-family zoning restrictions do not easily map onto the sort of 
“public goods”—schools, roads, parks, police protection, and parking 
facilities—that Professor Tiebout’s economic model addresses.274 The 
needs and preferences of an unrelated household with respect to these 
goods can be identical to those of a related household. The “distinction” 
between the two types of households created by the single-family 
ordinance may be one without a difference. Some examples might be 
instructive: A five-member household consisting of a couple and their 
child plus their divorced friend and her child probably has needs and 
                                                                                                                     
 270. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 
(1956). 
 271. See id. at 417.  
 272. Id. at 420–21.  
 273. Id. at 418–19. 
 274. See id. at 418.  
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preferences similar to those of a household consisting of a married couple 
and their three children. At the same time, a household consisting of five 
unrelated college students will have very different needs and preferences 
from a household consisting of five unrelated elderly widows. The 
relevant variables here are income, stage of life, and presence of children, 
not whether the groups are related. Thus, single-family zoning actually 
decreases efficiency by adding an irrelevant variable. 
Perhaps, however, the public good in Tiebout’s model is actually 
neighborhoods in which only related people occupy households. In other 
words, related-household neighborhoods are themselves the good that 
consumer-voters can decide they prefer.275 The problem here, of course, 
is that the people who live in unrelated households are themselves also 
consumer-voters. Banning them from certain neighborhoods (or whole 
towns) prevents them from exercising their choices, and therefore acts as 
a market distortion.  
Single-family ordinances fare even worse under the community self-
definition/participation rationale for local government legitimacy. This 
theory is best articulated in the works of Professor Gerald Frug276 and 
Professor Frank Michelman.277 Professor Frug points to local government 
as the entity best able to maximize citizen involvement and participation 
in the political process and assist individuals to feel most empowered to 
participate actively in the basic societal decisions that structure their 
lives.278 Professor Michelman describes a “public interest model” in 
which majority groups come together to express their shared values.279 
Thus, local government, as the smallest unit of government closest to the 
people, is the most appropriate forum for decisions about community 
identity and values. In other words, small communities should get to have 
a say in matters such as the household composition of their members, 
because this is an important part of their self-definition.  
This rationale echoes in some of the defenses of Belle Terre. Justice 
Douglas took particular note of the small size of the community of Belle 
Terre in his opinion.280 Professor Radin made the argument explicit, 
noting that “the case could easily involve property for personhood on 
both sides. . . . [T]he students argue that their leasehold is personal, and 
the townspeople argue that their [single-family preference] is personal. It 
is difficult to choose between these two arguments.”281 And Professor 
                                                                                                                     
 275. Tiebout does recognize that certain noneconomic variables, such as the desire to live 
near “nice people,” may affect people’s decisions about where to live. Id. at 418 n.12. 
 276. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). 
 277. Michelman, supra note 269, at 149.  
 278. Frug, supra note 276, at 1069. 
 279. Michelman, supra note 269, at 149. 
 280. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974). 
 281. Radin, supra note 155, at 1012.  
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Richard Briffault notes that “[Belle Terre’s] exclusion of people who 
practiced an alternative lifestyle was unobjectionable because it was seen 
as an action similar to that of a family choosing not [to] welcome an 
unwanted guest into its home.”282 
Yet while this model may be a satisfactory way of justifying certain 
local government actions, it fails on its own terms to validate municipal 
power to enact restrictive single-family ordinances. This is because if it 
is important for a local government, as the unit of government that is 
closest to the people, to express its values about household composition, 
it is just as important (if not far more so) for an even smaller and more 
personal entity—the individual households of that community—to make 
those decisions for themselves.  
Professor Michelman recognizes this when he points out that “[t]he 
arguments in favor of endowing community-sized groups with such 
capacity look, indeed, very like those for creating and protecting a free-
choice capacity for household groups.”283 As Professor Briffault also 
observed:  
The focus of local public policy on home and family and the 
use of local public powers to advance these private interests 
lead to an association of the locality with individual 
autonomy. [Local power is] treated as a right much like the 
personal right to privacy in one’s home and to make family 
decisions immune from state interference.284  
Government actions that invade private aspects of domestic life are no 
less intrusive when carried out by small municipal entities. And while 
local governments may be well equipped to address local concerns 
generally, this does not justify allowing them to dictate issues such as 
household composition.  
IV.  A LOOK BACKWARD, THE WAY FORWARD, AND CRITICISMS 
Restrictive single-family ordinances and the judicial decisions that 
uphold them, from Belle Terre on down, are marked in their lack of 
analytical rigor. In addition to their reflexive invocation of the police 
power and their heavy reliance on stereotypes, they are filled with value 
judgments masquerading as facts about what families look like and why 
people should live together. As with any statement that contains value 
judgments, it is important to look at the statement’s context and the biases 
of the person making it. 
                                                                                                                     
 282. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 346, 383 (1990).  
 283. Michelman, supra note 269, at 196.  
 284. Briffault, supra note 282, at 444–45. 
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Restrictive single-family ordinances are clearly a product of their 
time. In the 1950s and 60s, when they proliferated, the nuclear family 
model represented a majority of American households.285 This was 
already breaking down by the time Belle Terre, also a product of its time, 
was decided. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of significant 
social upheaval. Urban unrest, hippy communes, and socialist, 
antigovernment movements were more prevalent and viewed by many as 
threats to peaceful, middle class family life.286 In historical hindsight, this 
worldview is obvious in Belle Terre and many of the decisions that have 
followed it. 
Forty years later, many cities are gentrifying, hippy communes have 
mostly gone the way of the lava lamp, and socialist movements no longer 
epitomize an existential threat to American democracy. Today’s 
suburban household is far more likely to worry about subprime mortgage 
loans and ever-lengthening commutes than having a clothing-optional 
commune or a militant Chapter of Students for a Democratic Society 
moving in next door.  
At the same time, traditional families no longer comprise the majority 
of households.287 Between 1970 and 2012, the percentage of households 
composed of married couples with children dropped from 40% to 20%.288 
Nontraditional living arrangements are steadily increasing both in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage of households. According to the 
most recent Census, in 2010, 18.3 million people lived in a household 
with someone they were not related to, and one in eight homes contained 
one or more people not related to the householder.289  
All of these data confirm what anyone living in the early part of the 
twenty-first century can see firsthand: American culture has changed in 
ways that make coresidence increasingly likely for all types of people at 
all stages of life. The age of first marriage is steadily creeping upwards.290 
This means that people are more likely to live with roommates during 
young adulthood. A majority of marriages are preceded by a period of 
cohabitation, and for an increasing number of people cohabitation has 
replaced marriage. Unmarried childbearing, with or without cohabitation, 
                                                                                                                     
 285. See Alexander, supra note 26, at 1259–60. 
 286. See id. at 1261. 
 287. HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 2010, supra note 256, at 5 tbl.2. (showing that husband–wife 
family households now make up only 48.4% of households). 
 288. HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 2012, supra note 256, at 1. 
 289. HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 2010, supra note 256, at 2–3. The data indicate that 7.7 million 
lived with unmarried partners, 5.2 million with housemates or roommates, 3.8 million with “other 
nonrelatives,” and 1.5 million with a roomer or boarder. Id. at 2 tbl.1, 3. By 2012, 7,845,000 
households were comprised of cohabiters. HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 2012, supra note 256. 
 290. Figure MS-2 Median Age at First Marriage: 1890 to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/graphics/MS-2.pdf (last visited July 1, 
2015).  
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is at an all-time high and divorce is commonplace.291 Single or divorced 
parents may well need or prefer to live with unrelated household 
members. People are living longer, and older people who wish to “age in 
place” might require non-related household companions. Recent 
economic turmoil has created situations in which unrelated people of all 
ages are forced to live together to make ends meet.292  
Meanwhile, houses themselves have only been increasing in size. The 
average floor area and number of bedrooms for newly constructed homes 
has steadily increased since 1973.293 As nuclear families shrink while 
houses continue to grow, overcrowding—the prevention of which 
proponents so often give as a reason for restrictive single-family 
zoning—is at an all-time low.294 The problem, in fact, may soon be a 
mismatch between people and the housing stock: too many large houses, 
and too few large traditional families to fill them. 
Thus, the trend in American household arrangements is moving 
steadily away from the nuclear family ideal that gave rise to restrictive 
single-family ordinances in the first place. At the same time, many of the 
social conditions, stereotypes, fears, and assumptions that provided the 
backdrop to Belle Terre and its progeny no longer exist. Meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court has recognized increasingly robust privacy rights in a 
number of areas, with choice of household companions being one glaring 
absence.295  
In sum, Belle Terre was a poorly conceived decision from the start, 
and the intervening four decades have only made it look more legally and 
factually obsolete. Yet local governments across the country still continue 
                                                                                                                     
 291. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 347 (2011) (discussing the increase in births of 
nonmarital children).  
 292. See, e.g., Peter Bennett, Housemate Trend Growing, L.A TIMES (Mar. 6, 1994), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-03-06/realestate/re-30902_1_potential-housemate/2; Mara Lee, 
Recession Roommates, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/11/05/AR2009110505645.html; Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s 
Hidden Impact on S.F., S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/
item/Window-into-Airbnb-s-hidden-impact-on-S-F-30110.php; Tripp Whetsell, Boarder Patrol: 
Recession Forcing Older New Yorkers to Take in Roommates, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 18, 2010); 
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/real-estate/boarder-patrol-recession-forcing-older-new-
yorkers-roommates-article-1.174731. 
 293. FREDERICK J. EGGERS & ALEXANDER J. THACKERAY, ECONOMETRICA, 32 YEARS OF 
HOUSING DATA 12–13 (2007) (compiling data for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development Office of Policy Development and Research). 
 294. Id. at 14–15. 
 295. Belle Terre’s regressive approach to associational rights was so dramatic that it led one 
commentator to predict after the case was decided that other attempts to expand privacy rights 
were sure to fail. See Patricia Fitts Jacobson, Note, The Collision of Zoning Ordinances and the 
Constitutional Rights of Privacy and Association: Critique and Prognosis, 30 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 155, 181 (1979). In fact, the opposite was true, and Belle Terre simply remains as an outlier. 
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to regulate household composition, using Belle Terre as their touchstone. 
In light of this, it is clearly time for the Supreme Court to revisit the issue 
and to overturn Belle Terre. The Court should make a clear statement that 
the right of intimate association includes the right to choose household 
companions, and therefore all efforts to regulate internal household 
composition are suspect and deserving of a high level of scrutiny.  
Overturning Belle Terre will not leave local governments powerless 
to zone in ways designed to preserve peaceful, low-density residential 
neighborhoods.296 It would simply return the regulatory focus to the use 
of the building and its structural characteristics.297 The main purpose of 
designating a residential structure as a “single-family” home is to 
distinguish between buildings that contain a single dwelling unit and 
those that contain more than one. A single dwelling unit simply means a 
residential unit that is not divided into individual apartments with their 
own entrances and kitchens.298 All that matters is that the people share a 
single dwelling and live in it in a manner that is compatible with 
residential use (for example, they do not rent out rooms nightly or 
conduct business out of the home). Numerical occupancy limitations can 
and should still apply to prevent overcrowding, and other ordinances can 
be used to regulate parking, noise, property maintenance, and other 
aspects of the dwelling that might affect the surrounding neighborhood.  
This approach gets zoning boards and property inspectors out of the 
business of inquiring into personal relationships and requires them to use 
more tailored approaches to addressing neighborhood problems. More 
importantly, it recognizes that government should play no role in 
regulating household composition and allows people to structure their 
living arrangements as they see fit. Nevertheless, there are two central 
criticisms of this Article’s analysis and conclusions that require response; 
they come from opposite sides of the discourse—from supporters of 
single-family zoning laws and from fair housing advocates, who typically 
find themselves in opposition to such laws. 
The first criticism, from supporters of single-family zoning, can be 
summarized as follows: “Does this mean we have to tolerate the student 
ghetto?” They argue that a stable, middle-class family-oriented 
neighborhood can be destroyed by the introduction of even a few rental 
houses filled with rowdy college students. The houses and yards may not 
                                                                                                                     
 296. This approach would not even prevent governments from taking actions that affect 
household composition. Instead, it would simply mean that such actions would be subject to a 
high level of scrutiny.  
 297. Indeed, there are many jurisdictions that never changed this focus, and have always kept 
their zoning laws focused on single households rather than trying to define families. 2 RATHKOPF 
& RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 23:14. 
 298. See id. (noting that “single-housekeeping unit” is often defined as any living 
arrangement in which there are shared cooking and housekeeping facilities and in which all 
household members have access to the whole dwelling).  
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be maintained well; noise, trash, and parking problems are likely to ensue. 
Existing neighborhood residents may find their property values harmed. 
They may move out, allowing for more student housing to take their 
place, and the student ghetto is born. This is not an unrealistic concern. 
Most college towns probably have at least one of these neighborhoods 
and most non-student households probably do not want to live anywhere 
near there.299  
Yet there is no reason that the elimination of restrictive single-family 
zoning should mean that communities are helpless in the face of such 
problems. As discussed above, municipalities can and should continue to 
enforce numerical occupancy standards to guard against overcrowding. 
Parking pass systems or reasonable limitations on the number of cars 
registered to a single address can resolve parking issues. Criminal codes 
can address noise, litter, and raucous behavior. Often, the real problem is 
absentee landlords, who fail to maintain their property because they know 
students are unlikely to complain. In that case, municipalities should 
rigorously enforce property maintenance codes. If an overabundance of 
rentals is the problem, then owner-occupancy requirements that limit the 
percentage of houses in a particular neighborhood that can be rented can 
control the problem (although such requirements themselves are not 
without controversy).300 All of these measures control density and 
preserve the ambience of the neighborhood without privileging or 
excluding any particular type of person or relationship.  
A second criticism comes from fair housing advocates, who ask “Does 
the right to choose household companions mean that housemates and 
roommates are allowed to discriminate?” The short answer is, regretfully, 
“yes.” The right to freely associate has always existed in tension with 
civil rights statutes that seek to force associations on unwilling people. 
To protect a person’s choice of roommates is to give him license to 
discriminate, because the converse of the right to associate is the right to 
exclude.301 Indeed, two recent cases that support the right of association 
within the home, Roommate.com and Seniors, presented scenarios in 
which the goals of the Fair Housing Act were in direct conflict with the 
right to freely associate.302 
                                                                                                                     
 299. This complaint fails to recognize that not all students are the same. Four quiet medical 
students do not pose the same threat to neighborhood peace as a raucous fraternity house, yet all 
are affected equally by restrictive single-family zoning. Moreover, some college towns may 
actually help to create such student ghettos by imposing and enforcing restrictive single-family 
zoning laws everywhere else, thus confining and concentrating student living in one discrete area. 
 300. Many jurisdictions may not permit owner-occupancy restrictions, viewing them as 
impermissible limitations on the users, as opposed to the uses, of property. 2 RATHKOPF & 
RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 81:4. Of course, this same argument can be, and has been, used to 
attack restrictive single-family zoning laws as well. See supra Section III.C.  
 301. Inazu, supra note 97, at 168. 
 302. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 
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As a result, civil rights advocates may view cases in which the right 
of association trumps the statutory civil right as a loss.303 This is 
understandable. Invidious discrimination is hurtful and corrosive, no 
matter if carried out at a governmental, commercial, or a personal level.304 
Yet the more personal a discriminatory decision is, the stronger the liberty 
interest that attaches and the less justifiable any government interference 
will be.305 Thus, the law may appropriately regulate a person’s decisions 
about who to hire, or rent to, or admit into a school, but it is far less able 
to reach a person’s decision about who to marry, live with, or be friends 
with.306 At some point, these decisions start to look like “a private domain 
with no connection to law.”307 
It is also worth pointing out that the very individuals most likely to 
benefit from an elimination of single-family zoning laws are those who 
also benefit from fair housing laws: unmarried couples—gay or 
straight—who are raising children together; minority racial or ethnic 
groups; and people with unconventional religious practices. Indeed, fair 
housing laws have already been used to help some groups—foster 
families, disabled people, and Latino immigrants—combat the effects of 
restrictive single-family zoning ordinances.308  
These two concepts—freedom of association and 
antidiscrimination—may exist in tension, but there is no reason both 
cannot be accommodated by appropriately situating the dividing line 
between the two. Seniors and Roommate.com correctly locate this limit 
at the front door. If we view this through the Roberts doctrinal lens of 
intimate association, the size, type, and intimacy of the living 
arrangement will control whether the state (here, through Fair Housing 
laws) can interfere with people’s choices regarding who they live with. 
Under this analysis, people living together in a dwelling unit will enjoy 
an associational right to choose (and thus discriminate in their choice of) 
                                                                                                                     
1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012); Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1032–33 (11th 
Cir. 1992).  
 303. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 209 (critiquing the Roommate.com decision as overly 
broad and an unjustifiable expansion of the right of association that may have negative 
repercussions on the effectiveness of fair housing laws). 
 304. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1374–79 (2009) (discussing the effects of personal and 
state-sanctioned discrimination, as well as discrimination in the employment/networking sphere); 
Matt Zwolinski, Why Not Regulate Private Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1048–
54 (2006) (discussing the harmful effects on victims of commercial and private discrimination). 
 305. See Emens, supra note 304, at 1309–10; see also, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 209, at 113–
14, 149, 151 (discussing the protected liberty interest in the personal decisions that may attend 
the selection of a roommate, even where they are discriminatory).  
 306. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 304, at 1309–10; Kenneth L. Shropshire, Private Race 
Consciousness, 1996 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 629, 629–30. 
 307. Emens, supra note 304, at 1310.  
 308. Supra Section I.D. 
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living companions. However, apartment buildings or neighborhoods 
would be too big, nonintimate, and nonexclusive for such a right to apply 
to the entire building, complex, or neighborhood.  
It is important to note that recognizing a right to associate within the 
home does not mean that the Fair Housing Act or other civil rights laws 
do not protect roommates and housemates. These laws should still apply 
to claims that roommates or housemates might have against their landlord 
or housing provider. Laws that prohibit harassment or intimidation that 
interferes with a person’s right to housing should still apply to roommates 
and housemates,309 just as we criminalize domestic violence. The point is 
that, if the law recognizes a robust right of free association with respect 
to a person’s choices about household composition, fair housing laws that 
govern the availability of housing would not ordinarily apply to 
roommates and housemates vis a vis one another. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the message of this Article is a simple one: There is a right 
of intimate association within the home, and this right cannot be 
conditioned on any governmental actor’s subjective opinion about the 
value, motivation, or characteristics of the people who seek to invoke this 
right. For it is the very people who are least likely to win favor in the eyes 
of a judge or zoning board who are the most in need of protection. Just as 
those with unpopular messages may most powerfully invoke the right to 
free speech, people with nonmainstream living arrangements and 
lifestyles must be able to invoke their right of intimate association.310 
Thus, neither restrictive single-family zoning ordinances nor functional 
family reforms are constitutional exercises of the state’s authority.  
                                                                                                                     
 309. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2012) (prohibiting interference with, or coercion or intimidation of, 
a person exercising his rights under the Fair Housing Act). For a related argument, see generally 
Robert G. Schwemm, Neighbor-on-Neighbor Harassment: Does the Fair Housing Act Make a 
Federal Case out of It?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (2011).  
 310. See Wilkinson III & White, supra note 177, at 612–13 (“[T]he subjects of lifestyle 
protection are likely to be persons unable to gain redress through the political process. . . . Obloquy 
is reserved for those whose tastes are unconventional, whose tongues are thought sharp or vile, 
and whose dress or behavior seems irregular or shocking. Yet it is just such persons who give a 
constitution its mettle, and without whom human freedom would be limited to choices of which 
prevailing majorities approve.”). 
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